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THE ROSE INDUSTRY EXCEPTION FOR EARLY 
ENTRY INTO PESTICIDE TREATED GREENHOUSES: 
ROMANCE IN REGULATION 
John M. Megara* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)1 
is the most significant federal law regulating the production and use 
of pesticides.2 Chemical pesticides can be extremely harmful to hu-
mans and the environment because they never can affect solely the 
target pest that they are intended to destroy.3 FIFRA has twin policy 
objectives.4 On the one hand, FIFRA attempts to protect man and 
the environment from the harmful effects of pesticides,5 On the other, 
FIFRA tries to give growers the ability to use pesticides effectively 
for pest control purposes,6 
Pursuant to its delegated authority under FIFRA, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) generally prohibits farmworkers 
from working in greenhouses shortly after the application of pesti-
cides,7 Each pesticide has a specific interval of time that must elapse 
before workers are permitted to reenter and engage in hand harvest-
ing,S On December 18,1996, EPA granted the rose industry a limited 
exception to the early entry prohibition,9 The exception allows work-
* Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1997-1998. 
17 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994). 
2 See Linda J. Fisher et al., A Practitirmer's guide to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act: Part I, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,449, 10,450 (Aug. 1994). 
3 See id. at 10,451. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102, 38,104 (1992). 
8 See id. at 38,104. 
9 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA GRANTS ROSE GROWERS TwO-YEAR 
941 
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ers to hand harvest roses grown in greenhouses after they are treated 
with pesticides, but before the pesticides' specific time intervals have 
elapsed.10 The exception is not limited to certain specific pesticides, 
but is instead effective as to all pesticides used on roses.u EPA en-
gaged in a cost-benefit analysis when it decided to grant the rose 
industry exception.12 EPA found that the benefits of allowing early 
entry during the period of the exception were "substantial" and that 
early entry would "not pose unreasonable risks to rose workers."13 No 
other agricultural industry has been given such an exception to the 
regulations prohibiting early entry into pesticide treated areas.14 The 
exception will expire on October 4, 1999, unless the rose industry 
successfully seeks another exception.15 
The 1996 exception was the second time that EPA had granted the 
rose industry an exception to the worker reentry standards.16 The 
first exception was granted in 1994 and it expired after two years.17 
At the time, EPA stated that the exception was "temporary" so that 
the rose industry could change its practices to be consistent with the 
regulations.1s EPA also stated that future exceptions would be con-
sidered only if the rose industry could "clearly demonstrate that an 
aggressive attempt to develop and implement alternative practices" 
was made during the period of the exception.19 
This Comment argues that EPA failed to consider all of the re-
quired factors when the Agency engaged in a cost-benefit analysis 
that led to its decision to grant the rose industry exception.20 In 
addition, this Comment also discusses the problems with the use of 
EPA's cost-benefit analysis when dealing with worker health and the 
lack of a reasoned analysis when EPA changed its policies to grant 
the exception.21 
EXCEPTION TO WORKER PROTECTION STANDARD (Dec. 20, 1996) [hereinafter EPA PRESS 
RELEASE]. 
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(e)(7) (1996). 
15 See 62 Fed. Reg. 51,994, 51,998 (1997). 
16 See 61 Fed. Reg. 56,100, 56,101 (1996). 
17 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(e)(7); 59 Fed. Reg. 30,265, 30,270 (1994). 
18 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,270. 
19 See id. 
20 See infra Section VI. 
21 See id. Each year about 1.2 billion pounds of pesticides are used in the United States, making 
it the single largest user of pesticides in the world. See Ivette Perfecto & Baldemar Velasquez, 
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Section II discusses the history of pesticide legislation in the United 
States and the history of EPA's standard to protect farmworkers from 
exposure to pesticides. Section III explains how EPA farmworker 
protection regulations operate. This Section will pay particular atten-
tion to the industry specific exception process and its cost-benefit 
methodology. Section IV discusses both the 1994 and 1996 rose indus-
try exceptions to the prohibition on early entry into pesticide treated 
greenhouses. Section V discusses the difficulties with using cost-
benefit analysis and how the United States Supreme Court has inter-
preted OSHA with regard to such analysis. This Section also looks at 
cases involving the application of cost-benefit analysis under FIFRA's 
suspension of registration provisions. Section VI argues that EPA 
failed to examine all of the required factors in its cost-benefit analysis 
when it decided to grant the rose industry exception. This section 
makes other related arguments regarding the failure of cost-benefit 
analysis in general and the lack of reasoned analysis by the EPA when 
Farm Workers: Among the Least Protected, 18 ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY J., Mar.-Apr. 1992, 
at 13. Farmworkers suffer the most from the chemical dependency of United States agriculture. 
See id. It is therefore not surprising that "agriculture has been found to be the second most 
dangerous occupation in the United States." See Lori Nessel & Kevin Ryan, Migrant Farm-
workers, Homeless and Runaway Youth: Challenging the Barriers to Inclusion, 13 LAW & 
INEQ. J. 99, 108 n.39 (1994) (citing GENERAL ACCOUNT OFFICE REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
REQUESTERS, HIRED F ARMWORKERS, HEALTH AND WELL-BEING AT RISK 20 (1992». It has 
been estimated that as many as 313,000 farmworkers in the United States may fall victim to 
pesticide related illnesses each year, and that between 800 and 1000 farmworkers die each year 
from exposure to pesticides. See Perfecto & Velasquez, supra, at 13. Ninety percent of the 
approximately two million hired farmworkers in the United States are members of a minority 
group. See id. The majority are Chicanos, followed by Puerto Ricans, Caribbean blacks, and 
African Americans. See id. at 14. 
Agricultural interests in the United States exert an enormous amount of political pressure. 
See David A. Dana, Setting Environmental Priorities: The Promise of a Bureaucratic Solution: 
Breaking the Vicious Circle: Thward Effective Risk Regulation, 74 B.U. L. REV. 365, 377 (1994) 
(reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: 'IbWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION (1993». This can be seen by their routine acquisition of subsidies even in times of 
government budget cut backs. See id. Agriculture interests also have been extremely successful 
in avoiding environmental regulation despite the fact that agricultural pollution is both well 
documented and serious. See id. 
EPA did not feel it was required to perform any action pursuant to Executive Order Number 
12,898, entitled Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and 
Low-Income Populations, when it granted the rose industry exception because the exception 
"does not impose any requirements" and "[i]t only implements a technical correction to the Code 
of Federal Regulations." See 62 Fed. Reg. 51,994, 52,003 (1997). 
Although there may be arguments against the rose industry exception based on a theory of 
environmental justice, such a debate is outside the scope of this Comment due to limited 
publishing space. For further information on environmental justice, see generally Gerald Torres, 
Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431 (1994). 
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changing its policies. Finally, Section VII proposes an end to the use 
of cost-benefit analysis when granting specific industry exceptions to 
the prohibition on worker early entry into pesticide treated areas. 
II. HISTORY OF FIFRA AND THE WORKER PROTECTION 
STANDARD 
A. History of Pesticide Legislation 
The first weak attempt at federal pesticide regulation came in 1910 
with the enactment of the Insecticide Act of 1910.22 The Insecticide 
Act was mainly concerned with fraud, making it illegal to sell fraudu-
lently labeled pesticides.23 It did not require the registration of pesti-
cides nor did it develop guidelines for their use.24 
The Insecticide Act of 1910 was abandoned in 1947 when Congress 
enacted the original version of FIFRA.26 FIFRA provided for the 
labeling of pesticides and the seizure of misbranded pesticides.26 FI-
FRA also required pesticides that were sold or distributed in inter-
state commerce to be registered with the United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA).27 USDA's responsibilities for pesticide regu-
lation were later transferred to EPA upon its creation in 1970.28 
FIFRA was amended in 1972 by the Federal Environmental Pes-
ticide Control Act (FEPCA).29 FEPCA required EPA not to register 
a pesticide that caused "unreasonable adverse effects on the environ-
ment."30 FEPCA made it unlawful for a person ''to use any registered 
pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling"31 and provided 
both civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance.32 FEPCA pro-
vided that a person was liable for a penalty if another person em-
ployed by or acting for that person violated any provision of 
FEPCA.33 
22 Insecticide Act of 1910, ch. 191, 36 Stat. 331 (repealed 1947). 
23 See id. 
24 See Fisher et al., supra note 2, at 10,451. 
26 See Pub. L. No. 80--104, 61 Stat. 163, 172 (1947). 
26 See id. at 166, 170. 
27 See id. at 168. 
28 See Fisher et aI., supra note 2, at 10,452. 
29 Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972). 
30 See id. at 980. 
31 See id. at 990. 
32 See id. at 992-93. 
33 See id. at 993. FIFRA was further amended in 1975, 1978, 1988, 1990, and 1991 to deal with 
such issues as the cancellation of pesticides, data compilation and compensation, reregistration 
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Today, FIFRA allows EPA to register a pesticide if the Agency 
finds that "it will perform its intended function without unreasonable 
adverse effects on the environment.''34 The term ''unreasonable ad-
verse effects on the environment" is defined in FIFRA as "any un-
reasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the 
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of 
any pesticide."36 Therefore, when determining whether to register a 
pesticide, EPA engages in a cost-benefit analysis pursuant to the 
Act.36 
B. History of Farmworker Protection by EPA 
The 1972 FEPCA amendments to FIFRA authorized EPA to enact 
regulations to carry out the provisions ofFIFRA.37 EPA had enacted 
regulations dealing with farmworker protection and the labeling of 
pesticides before FIFRA was amended by FEPCA, but these regu-
lations were only informational until FEPCA made them enforce-
able.s8 Although Congress did not explicitly give authority to EPA to 
enact worker protection regulations in the Act, the legislative history 
of the 1972 Amendments to the Act suggested that protecting work-
ers from the hazardous effects of pesticides was intended.39 The 
United States Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry stated 
that "protection of man and the environment" was to be construed 
broadly and would include farmworker protection.40 The Committee 
stated that it "believes there can be no question . . . but . . . that 
[FEPCA] requires the Administrator to require that the labeling and 
classification of pesticides be such as to protect farmers, farm work-
ers, and others coming in contact with pesticides or pesticide resi-
dues."41 
of pesticides, voluntary cancellation of registration, and the correction of technical errors, 
respectively. See Fisher et al., supra note 2, at 10,452. 
34 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C) (1994). 
86 [d. § 136(bb). 
36 [d. § 136a(c)(5)(C). 
37 See Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973, 997 (1972). 
38 See Organized Migrants in Community Action v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) (citing 39 Fed. Reg. 16,888, 16,889 (1974». 
89 See 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102, 38,102 (1992). The Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry 
specifically rejected a proposal to include provisions for the protection of farmworkers in the 
Act. See id. 
40 See id. 
41 [d. at 38, 102--03 (quoting S. REP. No. 92--883, pt. 2 at 4:Hl6 (1972), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 4063». 
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In 1974, EPA promulgated such regulations under 40 Code of Fed-
eral Regulations part 170, the Worker Protection Standard, which 
regulated the activities of farmworkers engaged in hand labor opera-
tions in fields after the application of pesticides.42 The regulations 
prohibited reentry into pesticide treated fields until "the sprays had 
dried or dusts had settled and longer reentry intervals for 12 specific 
pesticides."48 The regulations also required protective clothing for 
workers that entered before the reentry interval had expired.44 
In Organized Migrants in Community Action v. Brennan, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
found that EPA had statutory authority under FIFRA to promulgate 
reentry standards to protect farmworkers.45 The plaintiffs brought 
suit against the U.S. Department of Labor to force it to issue regula-
tions protecting farmworkers from exposure to pesticides pursuant 
to the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).46 The court noted 
that EPA had already issued regulations regarding farmworker ex-
posure to pesticides (the 1974 regulations) and that the Department 
of Labor was therefore preempted from issuing similar regulations.47 
The plaintiffs then argued that EPA never had authority under 
FEPCA to issue the 1974 regulations.48 After examining both the 
statutory language and legislative history of FEPCA, the court found 
that EPA had authority to regulate farmworker exposure to pesti-
cides.49 
In 1992, EPA revised the 1974 worker protection standard, result-
ing in regulations that are still in effect.60 EPA changed the regula-
tions in part because of EPA's concern that the 1974 regulations did 
not cover farmworkers engaged in hand labor operations in green-
houses and that there had been an increased use of pesticides in 
agriculture since 1974.61 EPA also noted that despite the 1974 regula-
42 See id. at 38,103. 
43 See id. 
44 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,103. 
45 See Organized Migrants in Community Action v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). 
46 See id. at 1163~. 
47 See id. at 1169. 
48 See id. at 1164. 
49 See id. at 1165. 
60 See generally 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102 (1992). The effective date of the 1992 regulations was 
October 20, 1992. See 40 C.F.R. § 170.5(a) (1996). The accelerated compliance dates for some 
provisions was on April 21, 1993, and all other provisions were to be complied with after April 
15, 1994. See id. § 170.5(b), (c). 
5l See 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,103. 
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tions, "at least tens of thousands of acute illnesses and injuries and a 
less certain number of delayed onset illnesses occur annually to agri-
cultural employees as the result of occupational exposures to pesti-
cides."52 
III. EXPLANATION OF THE WORKER PROTECTION STANDARD 
A. The Worker Protection Standard 
The revised 1992 regulations established the Worker Protection 
Standard (WPS) which was "designed to reduce the risks of illness or 
injury resulting from workers' and handlers' occupational exposures 
to pesticides."53 The WPS prohibits the entry of workers to perform 
"hand labor" in greenhouses treated with pesticides during an inter-
val of time when the pesticide is considered dangerous, with a few 
exceptions.64 The WPS defines "hand labor" to mean "any agricultural 
activity performed by hand or with hand tools that causes a worker 
to have substantial contact with surfaces (such as plants, plant parts, 
or soil) that may contain pesticide residues."66 The restrictions for 
greenhouses are more stringent than those for farm or forest appli-
cation because production areas in greenhouses are often close to-
gether and plants requiring different pesticide treatments often oc-
cupy the same plant bed.66 The time interval that workers are not 
permitted to perform hand labor activities following a pesticide appli-
cation is called a restricted-entry interval (REI).67 The REI for each 
pesticide is set by EPA according to the toxicity of the pesticide 
(generally between four and forty-eight hours).53 "After the applica-
62 [d. at 38,105. 
68 40 C.F.R. § 170.l. In the scope and purpose provision of the WPS it states that the standard 
''requires workplace practices designed to reduce or eliminate exposure to pesticides." [d. 
64 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,104. The time interval provisions of the WPS are applicable ''when 
any pesticide product is used on an agricultural establishment in the production of agricultural 
plants." 40 C.F.R. § 170.102. The WPS is not applicable generally when pesticides are used for 
governmental wide-area public pest control programs (i.e. mosquitoes), on livestock, on non-
commercial home plants and home greenhouses, by injection directly into plants, for control of 
vertebrate pests, in traps, and for research uses of unregistered pesticides. See id. § 170.103. 
The regulations also exempt owners of agricultural establishments and their families from some 
provisions of the regulations, as well as those that qualify as "crop advisors" under the WPS. 
See id. § 170.104. 
66 40 C.F.R. § 170.3. The definition also contains a list of activities within the meaning of "hand 
labor" (harvesting is included) and a list of activities that do not constitute "hand labor" 
(activities involving irrigation are excluded). See id.; see also 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,109. 
66 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,109-10. 
57 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.3. 
68 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,104. Generally, a 48-hour REI is established for a pesticide that 
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tion of any pesticide on [sic] an agricultural employer shall not allow 
or direct any worker to enter or to remain in the treated area before 
the restricted-entry interval specified on the pesticide labeling has 
expired, except as provided in [section 170.112]."59 
Although the WPS generally prohibits entry into pesticide treated 
areas during an REI, EPA recognizes that pesticides may be danger-
ous for many days after the REI has expired.60 EPA has also recog-
nized that pesticide REIs are based on "average" conditions and 
cannot take into account all of the potential factors that can affect the 
length of time that pesticide residues remain hazardous to workers.61 
In order to minimize the risk of lingering pesticide residues to work-
ers both before and after the expiration of an REI, EPA requires the 
agricultural employer to provide a decontamination site reasonably 
accessible to workers who enter treated areas during an REI and up 
to thirty days after the expiration of an REI,62 EPA also requires 
workers to be given pesticide safety information when entering a 
pesticide treated area up to thirty days after the expiration of an 
REI,63 
contains an active ingredient in toxicity category I (most toxic category), which is extended to 
72 hours if the active ingredient organoposhate is being applied outdoors. See id. Pesticides with 
active ingredients in Category II (moderate toxic category) generally have a REI of 24 hours. 
See id. A REI of 12 hours is established for all other pesticides. See id. 
69 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(a). When two or more pesticides are applied at the same time, the REI 
is set as the longest of the applicable time periods. See id. § 170.112(a)(3). In order to make the 
provisions of the WPS enforceable under FIFRA § 12(a)(2)(G), which makes it "unlawful for 
any person ... to use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling," the 
pesticide label must specify the WPS restrictions. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,132. Therefore, EPA 
incorporates the requirements of 40 C.F.R. part 170 (the WPS regulations) by reference on the 
labels of each pesticide product. See id. 
60 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,123. In one 1989 study, noted by EPA, of poisoning incidents that 
occurred after the expiration of a REI, it was found that the median time from application of 
the pesticide to the poisoning incident was 29 days. See id. The study was conducted by Knaak, 
Iwata, and Maddy. See id. More recently EPA studied data regarding the incidence of multiple 
case systematic illnesses of agricultural workers from exposure to the residues of organophos-
phates in California. See id. Among the 44 incidents studied, the mean length of time from 
application to poisoning was 20 days, with a median of 16 days. See id. In 1985, EPA used a 
computer model to estimate how long dangerous pesticide residues might persist after applica-
tion, and found that for at least one pesticide it was predicted to remain for 30 days after the 
REI had expired. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,123. 
61 See id. at 38,135. 
62 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 170.112(c)(8), 170.150(a)(I)(i); 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,123. The decontamination 
site must contain water, soap, and single-use towels for routine washing and emergency 
eyefiushing. See 40 C.F.R. § 170.150(b). 
68 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.130(a)(3). 
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B. Exceptions to the Prohibition on Early Entry 
Agricultural workers can enter greenhouses treated with pesti-
cides during an REI under certain narrow exceptions.64 Farmworkers 
can enter treated areas during an REI when they will not be required 
to have contact with any treated surfaces.66 Workers are also allowed 
to enter treated areas during an REI when they are performing 
short-term tasks that do not involve hand labor activity.66 Another 
exception to the early entry67 prohibition during an REI occurs when 
there is an agricultural emergency and entry is necessary to save a 
crop.68 The EPA can also grant exceptions to the WPS prohibition on 
a case-by-case basis to affected individuals or industries if abiding by 
the restrictions would cause them to "bear an unreasonable economic 
burden."69 
Even when early entry is allowed, workers who will have contact 
with treated surfaces are not permitted to enter for the first four 
hours after a pesticide application.70 The regulations require that the 
agricultural employer ensure that early entry workers are informed 
64 See id. § 170.112(b)-(e); 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,104. 
66 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(b)(I); 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,104. The exception requires that the worker 
''have no contact with anything that has been treated with the pesticide to which the [REI] 
applies, including, but not limited to, soil, water, air, or the surfaces of plants." 40 C.F.R. 
§ 170.112(b)(1) (emphasis added). For example, pesticides are considered to be in the air in a 
greenhouse when any inhalation exposure level listed on the product's labeling has not yet been 
reached. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,111. Therefore, workers must wait until after any such inhalation 
level has been attained before they can enter under the no contact exception. See id. Also, 
workers wearing special personal protective equipment as defined in the regulations are not 
considered to have no contact for purposes of the exception. See id. at 38,112. 
66 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(c)(I); 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,104. The regulations only allow early entry 
for short term tasks when the time in which the worker is within the treated area does not 
exceed one hour in any 24 hour period, no entry is permitted for the first four hours after an 
application, and any inhalation and ventilation criteria on the product labeling must have been 
met. See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(c)(2) and (3). 
67 "[E]arly entry" is defined as "entry by a worker into a treated area on the agricultural 
establishment after a pesticide application is complete, but before any restricted-entry interval 
for the pesticide has expired." 40 C.F.R. § 170.3. 
68 See id. § 170.112(d)(2); 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,104. "[A]gricultural emergency" is defined as: 
a sudden occurrence or set of circumstances which the agricultural employer could not 
have anticipated and over which the agricultural employer has no control, and which 
requires entry into a treated area during a restricted-entry interval, when no alterna-
tive practices would prevent or mitigate a substantial economic loss. A substantial 
economic loss means a loss in profitability greater than that which would be expected 
based on the experience and fluctuations of crop yields in previous years. 
40 C.F.R. § 170.112(d)(I). 
69 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(e); 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,104. 
70 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(c)(3). 
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about the product's labeling requirements relating to the pesticide's 
use and safety.71 Of particular importance is the responsibility of the 
agricultural employer to assure that early entry workers who will 
have contact with pesticide treated surfaces wear the personal pro-
tective equipment (PPE) that is specified on the labeling of the pes-
ticide used.72 "Personal protective equipment" is defined in the regu-
lations as "devices and apparel that are worn to protect the body from 
contact with pesticides or pesticide residues."73 The agricultural em-
ployer must provide PPE to workers when necessary and ensure that 
PPE is cleaned, repaired, and stored properly after use.74 
EPA has been skeptical about the effectiveness of PPE and is 
concerned that it may cause more problems then it solves.76 In fact, 
EPA originally prohibited early entry during a REI for hand labor 
such as harvesting because of EPA's conclusion that such entry is 
rarely necessary, that PPE is impractical because field workers may 
remove it or use it incorrectly, and that PPE can also pose risks to 
worker health due to heat stress.76 To reduce the risks of heat stress, 
71 See id. § 170.112(c)(5). In addition, any worker that enters a treated area before the 
expiration of a REI must be specifically trained in safety precautions and the health aspects of 
pesticide exposure during the five years prior to entry. See 40 C.F.R. § 170.130(a). Training 
agricultural workers can be repetitive and expensive because of the high turnover rate in the 
agricultural industry (1000 percent is not uncommon). See 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,126. 
72 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(c)(4); 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,104. 
7340 C.F.R. § 170.112(c)(4)(i). Such PPE includes, but is not limited to, "coveralls, chemical-
resistant suits, chemical-resistant gloves, chemical-resistant footwear, respiratory protection 
devices, chemical-resistant aprons, chemical-resistant headgear, and protective eyewear." [d. 
However, normal items of work clothing, such as shirts, long pants, shoes and socks, are not 
considered PPE. See id. § 170.112(c)(4)(ii). 
74 See id. § 170.112(c)(6). 
75 See 59 Fed. Reg. 30,265, 30,265 (1994); 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,112. 
76 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,265. EPA has stated: 
The Agency has studied the issue of PPE for agricultural field workers who are 
performing routine hand labor tasks and has concluded that routine use of PPE ... for 
such field workers is, in general, not only impractical, but also may be risk-inducing 
due to heat stress concerns. The Agency has determined that hired agricultural work-
ers, especially harvesters, have a disincentive to wear PPE; because they frequently 
are paid at a piece rate, they have little tolerance for anything that hinders speed and 
efficiency. The Agency concludes that it is likely that the PPE would be removed or 
would be worn incorrectly if it were required routinely in most hand labor situ-
ations .... After consideration of the comments and the available data, the Agency has 
concluded that, under most circumstances, allowing routine entry for unlimited time 
to areas under an REI, even with PPE, decontamination, and training, will not reduce 
adequately the risk of agricultural workers' exposure to pesticides, and that the 
economic benefits associated with such routine early entry do not justify the risks 
associated with such early entry. 
57 Fed. Reg. at 38,112. 
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the regulations require that agricultural employers use appropriate 
precautions to prevent heat-related illness when workers perform 
tasks while wearing PPE.77 
C. Industry Specific Exceptions Based on Cost-Benefit Analysis 
EPA allows anyone affected by the requirements of the WPS to 
request an exception to the prohibition on early entry into pesticide 
treated areas during a REV8 In determining whether to grant the 
exception, 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(e)(3) states that "EPA will base its 
decision on whether the benefits of the exception outweigh the costs, 
including the value of the health risks attributable to the exception."79 
EPA believes that FIFRA requires such a cost-benefit analysis when 
it grants or denies an exception.80 An exception may be withdrawn by 
EPA at any time if the Agency determines that the health risks of 
early entry are unacceptable or if the exception is no longer neces-
sary.81 
EPA has granted a few limited exceptions to the WPS require-
ments using such a cost-benefit analysis.82 These exceptions include 
an exception to perform certain irrigation tasks, an exception to per-
form certain limited contact tasks, and the 1994 and 1996 rose indus-
tryexceptions.83 
77 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(c)(7). 
78 See id. § 170.112(e). EPA prefers that persons who wish to submit a request for exception 
do so as a group or association of affected parties, rather than as individuals, to ensure a more 
efficient review process. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,113. 
79 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(e)(3). The regulations state that "EPA will not grant exceptions where 
the costs of early entry equal or exceed the expected loss in value of crop yield or quality." [d. 
§ 170.112(e)(I)(vi). 
80 See 62 Fed. Reg. 51,994, 51,994 (1997). The affected individual or industry is required to 
submit certain information to EPA, including a description of the specific crops and crop 
production tasks for which the exception is requested, the time period that the exception will 
cover, and a description of the geographic area covered by the exception. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 170.112(e)(I)(ii)-(iv). The request also must include an explanation, with supporting data, of 
the necessity of the exception. See id. § 170.112(e)(1)(iii). The request must also describe the 
safety aspects of the exception, including the feasibility of performing the necessary hand labor 
while wearing PPE and the means of reducing heat stress. See id. § 170.112(e)(1)(vi). The 
request also must explain why alternative practices would not be technically or financially 
viable. See id. § 170.112(e)(I)(v). The regulations suggest several alternatives to early entry, 
including rescheduling pesticide applications or hand labor activity, using non-chemical pest 
control techniques, using machine cultivation, or using a substitute pesticide with a shorter REI. 
See id. § 170.112(e)(I)(v). 
81 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(e)(6). 
82 See id. § 170.112(e)(7). 
83 See id. 
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EPA has considered several other industries for exception to the 
WPS requirements.84 At the time of the adoption of the WPS in 1992, 
EPA believed that the cut flower and cut fern industry would warrant 
an exception to the early entry prohibition.85 However, when a copy 
of the proposed WPS was put before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the U.S. House Committee 
on Agriculture as required by FIFRA § 25(a), Congress commented 
that they "[s]trongly object to the exemption for cut flower and cut 
fern workers for early entry. Congress notes that California prohibits 
early entry for hand labor without apparent deleterious effect on the 
cut flower industry."85 The cut flower and cut fern industry has since 
declined to seek an exception.87 
On June 12, 1995, Delaware sought an exception to the prohibition 
against worker entry into Chlorothalonil-treated cantaloupe and 
squash fields before the expiration of its forty-eight hour REI.88 Later, 
ten other states sought similar exceptions.89 Chlorothalonil is a fungi-
cide used to destroy Downy Mildew disease and has been classified as 
a probable human carcinogen.90 Chlorothalonil can cause eye and skin 
irritation and can have adverse effects on the kidneys.91 Delaware 
asserted that cantaloupe and squash crops were being destroyed by 
Downy Mildew and that Chlorothalonil needed to be applied every 
seven days.92 Delaware believed that spray schedules could not be 
changed because no matter how the grower scheduled them, an REI 
of forty-eight hours would follow an application, and harvesting may 
be necessary because of weather conditions during that time.93 EPA 
84 See 61 Fed. Reg. 68,034, 68,034 (1996); 60 Fed. Reg. 49841, 49844 (1995); 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102, 
38,113 (1992). 
85 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,113. 
86 Id. at 38,138. EPA responded to the comment by stating that California had established a 
minimum REI according to a "sprays have dried/dusts have settled" standard and a maximum 
REI of 24 hours. See id. Since EPA-mandated REIs are generally longer, the economic cost of 
complying with the EPA regulations is likely to be higher than the cost of complying with 
California's rules. See id. Therefore, EPA believed (at the time the WPS was promulgated) that 
the cut flower and cut fern industry exception would be warranted. See id. 
87 See 57 Fed. Reg. 30,265, 30,265 (1994). 
B8 See 60 Fed. Reg. 30,872, 30,873 (1995). Delaware had asked EPA to allow workers to enter 
treated fields and perform hand harvesting only 12 hours after application of Chlorothalonil. See 
61 Fed. Reg. 29,096, 29,097 (1996). 
89 See 60 Fed. Reg. at 49,842. 
90 See 60 Fed. Reg. at 30,873. 
91 See 60 Fed. Reg. at 49,844. 
92 See 60 Fed. Reg. at 30,873. 
93 See id. It was argued that other pesticides, such as Maneb and Penncozeb, could not be used 
because they required that harvesting not be done until five days after pesticide application 
(squash and cantaloupe are harvested daily). See id. 
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stated that the most that growers would have to delay harvesting 
would be twenty-four hours.94 According to Delaware, a delay in har-
vesting of twenty-four hours would result in the fruit being overripe.96 
Cantaloupes are produced for a fresh market only, while overripe 
squash can be downgraded for bulk processing.96 Maryland estimated 
that a maximum of ten to fifteen percent loss of yield would be 
incurred for both crops,97 while Delaware estimated that fifty to sev-
enty percent of grower net revenue would be lost without the excep-
tion.98 Despite these claims, EPA stated that it had ''incomplete infor-
mation" and that it was "not able to quantify or complete a reliable 
qualitative assessment of the projected economic impacts, yield loss 
and grower profit associated with loss of harvest days."99 On Septem-
ber 27, 1995, EPA denied the requests for all eleven states stating 
that "the risks of the exception outweigh the benefits.JJ1OO 
IV. THE ROSE INDUSTRY EXCEPTIONS TO THE WPS 
On October 30, 1996, Roses Incorporated, a national association that 
represents rose growers, made a request to EPA for an exception to 
allow rose workers to hand harvest roses in greenhouses before the 
expiration of a REI.lol In its request, Roses Inc. asserted that the 
public demands roses that are cosmetically perfect, and therefore, 
pesticides must be used to control insects and disease.loo Roses Inc. 
94 See 60 Fed. Reg. at 49,843. 
96 See id. 
96 See id. 
97 This estimation was based on the assumption that a one day delay in harvesting would occur 
each week resulting in a loss of one seventh of grower's total production. See id. 
98 See id. 
99 See 60 Fed. Reg. at 49,844. 
100 See id. In late March 1996, Indiana petitioned EPA for an exception to allow workers to 
enter Chlorothalonil-treated muskmelon fields before the expiration of the 48 hour REI. See 61 
Fed. Reg. 68,034, 68,034 (1996). Indiana asserted that growers would suffer substantial economic 
losses if they could not harvest their crop on a daily basis. See id. Indiana stated that muskmel-
ons must be harvested daily to avoid the fruit from becoming overripe. See 61 Fed. Reg. 29,096, 
29,097 (1996). During a 48 hour REI many of the muskmelons would be lost due to their 
becoming overripe when unable to be harvested. See id. Also, when melons are lett in the field 
they suck nutrients from the soil away from other growing fruit. See id. Indiana contended that 
there was no substitute for Chlorothalonil during harvest season and that rescheduling of spray 
applications would not be possible. See id. at 29,098. Indiana asserted that a crop loss of 7% 
would result from the 48 hour REI and a 24 hour REI would result in a 2% loss. See id. at 29,097. 
Indiana calculated the loss of income for growers to be 28% for a 24 hour delay and 59% for a 
48 hour delay. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 29,098. Atter going through EPA's 30 day comment period, 
Indiana withdrew its petition. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 68,034. 
101 See 61 Fed. Reg. 56,100, 56,101 (1996). 
ill.! See id. 
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stated that at least twenty-eight pesticide chemicals, with REIs rang-
ing from twelve to forty-eight hours, are essential to the rose indus-
try, including chlorothalonil, chlorpyrifos, endosulfan, mancozeb, and 
vinclozolin.I03 Survey data collected by Roses Inc. suggest that grow-
ers treat roses with pesticides an average 6.4 times per month.I04 
According to Roses Inc., varieties of roses reach the harvest stage in 
cycles 365 days per year.106 Roses Inc. believed that roses that are cut 
when not in bloom stage, where the bud is just beginning to open, 
have no commercial value.loo The flowers bloom twice daily and remain 
in the bud stage for a period oftwo to six hours.107 Roses Inc. asserted 
that the possibility of a second daily harvest is eliminated on days 
when pesticides with an REI greater than four hours are applied in 
the late morning because workers are prevented from reentering the 
area due to the WPS early entry restrictions. lOB For pesticides with 
longer REIs, the pesticide application may eliminate both harvests 
for the following day as well.109 According to Roses Inc., without an 
exception losses would be seven to fourteen percent of the annual 
harvestUO and revenues would decrease by eight to sixteen million 
dollars annually.111 Roses Inc. estimated that the average growerU2 in 
the United States has three acres under rose production and that 
abiding by the WPS without the exception would result in an annual 
loss for each grower of $11,500 to $36,600 per acre.U3 
103 See id. According to Roses Inc., the insect and disease problems that must be controlled 
through the use of pesticides include aphids, botrytis, downy mildew, powdery mildew, spider 
mites, thrips, and whiteflies. See id. 
104 See 62 Fed. Reg. 51,994, 51,995 (1997). 
106 See 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,101. A single rose plant produces about 24 roses per year. See id. 
106 See id. "Perfection for cut-roses requires the buds to have the same si2e, shape, and degree 
of maturity." 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,995. A secondary market for imperfect roses consisting of street 
vendors exists, but prices are 50% to 75% lower than the prime market price. See id. at 51,996. 
107 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,995; 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,101. 
108 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,994. 
109 See id. 
110 The USDA 1995 Floriculture Crops Report estimates the farm gate value of the United 
States greenhouse produced rose crop at approximately $124 million. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,102. 
111 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,996. Other growers estimated losses between 10% and 30% of the 
annual harvest per year. See id. 
112 According to Roses Inc., in 1996, about 200 rose growers cultivated more than 15 million 
rose plants in the United States. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,101. Forty-six percent of all growers 
are located in California and produce at least 65% of United States total production. See 62 Fed. 
Reg. at 51,997. 
113 See 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,102. EPA stated: 
The estimated losses of $11,500 to 36,600 per acre are derived from a predicted loss of 
the equivalent of one harvest per week due to compliance with the WPS and are 
calculated using average July prices for selected Tea roses in California and New 
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EPA had previously granted the rose industry a two-year excep-
tion to the WPS early entry restrictions on June 10, 1994.114 At the 
time, EPA found that the rose industry would "suffer substantial 
economic impact" if required to comply with the early entry restric-
tions.116 EPA granted the exception based on information submitted 
by the rose industry, despite its own conclusion that EPA had "in-
sufficient information to project quantitatively the economic impacts 
of not granting an exception to rose growers."116 EPA did find that 
without the exception "rose growers would be forced to change their 
practices" and that this would lead, at least in the short run, to 
a decrease in growers' revenues, increased costs of production, or 
both.ll7 The EPA believed that early entry into greenhouses treated 
with pesticides during the two-year period of the exception would not 
pose "unreasonable adverse effects" to workers.118 
EPA granted the exception to give the rose industry time to bring 
their practices into compliance with the regulations.119 EPA spe-
cifically provided that the two-year exception was "to provide rose 
growers time to adjust pesticide spray schedules, find early-entry 
alternatives, and develop technology."12o EPA stated: 
[d. 
A [two-year] time limit will encourage development and imple-
mentation of safer methods of pest control. EPA believes that 
time and research are needed to develop sustainable alternatives 
to early entry, but that the industry should aggressively work 
toward implementation of alternatives that have been proven 
effective. EPA expects that much early entry can be eliminated 
immediately through "planning and shifting personnel," and that 
in 2 years other alternatives to toxicity category I and II pesti-
cides can be implemented. l2l 
England. These figures appear to be based on the frequency that Roses Inc. estimates 
pesticides are normally applied in rose production, the toxicity categories of the pes-
ticides most commonly used on roses, and the asserted need to harvest roses two times 
per day to ensure the harvested crop will yield a premium price. 
114 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(e)(7) (1996). The two-year time limit of the exception seems to have 
been based, at least in part, on Roses Inc.'s estimate in 1988 that it would take five to seven 
years "for the rose industry to develop alternatives to toxicity category I and II pesticides." 
See 59 Fed. Reg. 30,265, 30,269 (1994). 
115 See id. at 30,265. 
116 See id. at 30,266. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. at 30,265. 
119 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,265. 
120 [d. 
121 [d. at 30,269. 
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EPA stated that the exception was only "temporary"122 and that an-
other exception would be considered if the rose industry could 
"clearly demonstrate that an aggressive attempt to develop and im-
plement alternative practices was made during the period of thEe] 
exception."l23 
Under the 1994 exception, workers were not allowed to perform 
hand activity operations in pesticide treated areas for more than three 
hours in any twenty-four hour period.124 Also, rose growers were 
required to provide workers with PPE when they entered green-
houses to perform hand labor during a REl,126 EPA stated that its 
concerns that PPE might be removed by workers, or otherwise used 
incorrectly, and the risk of heat stress that PPE posed to workers, 
was mitigated by a variety of factors in the particular case of the rose 
industry: 
PPE would be worn for only limited periods of time; harvesters 
could work relatively efficiently while wearing the required PPE; 
water for drinking and decontamination is immediately available 
in most rose greenhouses; and the usual presence in rose green-
houses of fans or other mechanical ventilation to provide some 
cooling. 126 
EPA also required as "conditions" of the exception that no entry take 
place during the first four hours after a pesticide application or until 
any inhalation criteria specified on the product label had been met, 
that decontamination areas be established, and that safety training 
be given to early entry harvesters.127 The two-year 1994 exception 
expired on June 10, 1996.128 
In response to Roses Inc. second exception request on October 30, 
1996/29 EPA noted that "[t]he cut-rose industry was not able to make 
122 See id. at 30,270. 
123 See id. 
124 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,267. 
125 See id. at 30,268. 
126 [d. at 30,269. The time period that workers would be required to wear PPE would be 
limited by the maximum time limit of three hours in any 24 hour period that workers are 
permitted to remain in pesticide-treated greenhouses during a REI. See id. at 30,265. Also, EPA 
stated that "greenhouses usually encompass a much smaller area than field crops so that 
employers should more easily be able to ensure that workers wear the PPE." See id. 
127 See id. at 30,267. 
128 See id. at 30,272. 
129 See 61 Fed. Reg. 56,100, 56,101 (1996). On May 16, 1996, before the 1994 exception expired, 
Roses Inc. made a request for EPA to extend the 1994 exception. See id. However, EPA denied 
the request at that time because Roses Inc. had not provided enough information to grant the 
extension and there was insufficient time for EPA to process the request. See id. On June 14, 
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adequate progress over the 2 years that the original exception was in 
place to eliminate the need for renewal."130 In response to EPA's 
concerns over the inability of the rose industry to bring itself into 
compliance during the period of the 1994 exception, Roses Inc. gave 
a number of reasons for the slower progress than expected by the 
industry.13l Roses Inc. noted that new pesticides with shorter REIs 
and biological controls had not been developed as quickly as hoped.132 
Roses Inc. noted the increased costs of pesticide product development 
and registration, and that growers did not feel that registration of 
products was cost effective because of the small size of the rose 
industry.l33 Also, Roses Inc. asserted that the industry has not had 
the resources necessary to implement alternatives due to strong for-
eign competition.l34 In addition, certain pesticides that were used 
extensively by the rose industry before 1988 have since been taken 
off the market, and new and more resistant pests have become a 
problem for the industry.136 
Although EPA proposed alternatives to granting the exception, 
Roses Inc. cited economic and industry specific reasons why the al-
ternatives were not feasible.136 One alternative to the exception that 
was debated by growers and scientists would involve spraying after 
1996, Roses Inc. then requested on June 14, 1996 after the first exception had expired that EPA 
issue an Administrative Order that would give the rose industry protection from enforcement 
of the early entry provisions of the WPS. See id. EPA declined to issue such an order without 
conducting a cost-benefit analysis as required by the WPS. See id. 
130 62 Fed. Reg. 51,994, 52,000 (1997). 
181 See 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,102. 
182 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,996. However, some individual growers commented that they had 
attempted using biological controls, such as predatory mites. See id. 
188 See 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,102. 
184 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,996. The impact of the importation of roses from foreign countries, 
where pesticide regulation is not as strong, is a major concern of Roses Inc. and growers. See 
id. Sixty-six percent of the United States market is made up of imported roses, which forces 
domestic growers to reach high quality standards at lower prices. See id. According to a March 
1995 U.S. International Trade Commission Report, almost half of rose growers incurred net 
losses in 1991 and 1992 and two-thirds of growers incurred net losses in 1993. See id. However, 
EPA noted that it was not possible to fully interpret the budget data from the Report without 
more details. See id. 
186 See 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,102. 
186 See id. For example, rose growers did not want to rely on a given set of pesticide products 
with shorter REIs because they asserted that it would encourage the growth of more resistant 
pests. See id. For fungal diseases, such as downy mildew, that spread when plants are wet or 
humidity is high, EPA suggested active drying of foliage. See id. Dry plants also would allow 
for application of pesticides at times when foliage would otherwise dry too slowly. See id. Roses 
Inc. stated that active drying methods have either large start-up costs or are expensive to use. 
958 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:941 
the last harvest of the day, with reentry into the greenhouse after the 
twelve hour REI of most pesticides expired the following morning.137 
Usually, pesticides are applied in the late morning when several pests 
are most active and when pesticide sprays would dry most rapidly.l33 
As previously stated, this late morning spraying usually prohibits an 
afternoon harvest because of the length of most REls.139 Several 
scientists and growers believe that late day spraying would slow leaf 
drying which might increase the prevalence of diseases.l40 However, 
other scientists and growers believe that late day spraying would be 
acceptable.141 EPA noted that several growers commented that they 
had used late day spraying successfully after the expiration of the 
first exception.l42 EPA concluded that "spraying after the last harvest 
was generally claimed to be unacceptable for a number of reasons ... 
However, little documentation was presented concerning these short-
comings, and there was no evidence given regarding their impact. 
Some of these shortcomings, while generally accepted, remain hypo-
thetical or anecdotal."l43 
When EPA granted the 1994 exception to the rose industry it 
stated that "worker exposure risk is a serious concern in greenhouse 
rose production."l44 In response to the 1996 exception request, some 
commenters noted that the large number and high volume of pesti-
cides used, as well as the high frequency of applications typical in the 
rose industry, indicated both high worker exposure and high worker 
risk.145 Many of the twenty-eight products that Roses Inc. cited as 
essential are classified by EPA in Toxicity Categories I and II, based 
on their acute toxicity.l46 "Acute toxicity is the capability of producing 
adverse effects from a brief exposure."147 EPA stated: 
See 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,102. Roses Inc. also stated that other non-chemical pest control methods, 
such as high intensity discharge lighting, horizontal air flow fans, night curtains, infrared radiant 
heat lines, and step dehumidification, had either prohibitive start-up costs or were too expensive 
to use. See id. Roses Inc. asserted that alternatives such as rearranging work schedules or 
changing spray schedules were also too expensive. See id. 
137 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,995. 
138 See id. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. 
14.2 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 52,000. 
1411Id. 
144 See 59 Fed. Reg. 30,265, 30,266-67 (1994). 
145 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,997. 
148 See 61 Fed. Reg. 56,100, 56,103 (1996). 
147Id. 
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Laboratory animal studies of some Toxicity Category I and II 
chemicals demonstrated other effects associated with long-term 
exposure, such as increased cancer rates, reproductive and devel-
opmental effects and effects on the nervous system. Routine re-
peated occupational exposures (that would occur during early-en-
try rose harvesting) become a greater risk concern when the 
chemicals can pose long-term effects.148 
959 
"EPA does not have sufficient data to determine whether the poten-
tial level of exposure to rose harvesters corresponds to levels of 
concern identified in the toxicological studies that demonstrated these 
effects."149 Some commenters believed that the greenhouse environ-
ment is more humid and warm which might discourage workers from 
wearing PPE and might induce heat stress when PPE is worn.1oo EPA 
noted that industry practice requires that rose workers "have consid-
erable contact with plant foliage" while harvesting.151 EPA also noted 
a study, compiled by the California Department of Industrial Rela-
tions from 1981 to 1990, that indicated that workers in horticultural 
specialty crops (which include roses), had a higher rate of pesticide 
poisonings among workers (0.53 poisonings per 1000 workers per 
year) than for agricultural workers in general (0.46 poisonings per 
1000 workers per year).152 
Other commenters believed that the risk to workers was much less 
because of characteristics specific to the rose industry.153 They be-
lieved that rose workers form a "stable, skilled work force" that tends 
to be receptive to safety training. 1M Also, workers are generally paid 
on an hourly or salary basis instead of a piece rate, which makes it 
less likely that workers would avoid using PPE if it would slow their 
work.155 Some commenters noted that the greenhouse environment 
provides easy access to decontamination facilities and easy monitoring 
148 Id. 
149 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,998. 
150 See id. at 51,997. 
151 See 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,103. 
152 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,998. This report also was noted by EPA in its 1994 rose industry 
exception decision. See 59 Fed. Reg. 30,265, 30,266 (1994). EPA also discussed in its 1994 
exception decision another study that indicated that workers in the cut flower industries may 
actually sustain greater exposure to pesticides than the workers who apply them. See id. 
However, EPA noted that workers in that study did not wear any protective clothing when they 
were exposed to the pesticides. See id. at 30,267. 
153 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,997. 
154 See id. Roses Inc. estimates that the entire rose industry employs 1580 greenhouse pro-
duction workers, with about 1190 (75%) employed as harvesters. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,101. 
155 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,997. 
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of workers to ensure compliance with safety rules.156 EPA noted a 
report for the 1990 to 1994 period which showed that only three cases 
of pesticide-related illness linked to the California rose industry were 
reported during the period.157 Although EPA believed that pesticide-
related illness incident reporting might be higher in California,158 the 
Agency noted several reasons to believe that such studies only docu-
ment a fraction of the actual incidents of illness.159 Commenters noted 
that farmworkers often lack the financial means to receive medical 
aid, medical providers might not recognize or report symptoms of 
pesticide-related illnesses, incidents may not be reported because 
pesticide poisoning often mimics the symptoms of colds and fiu, and 
the delayed effects of pesticide poisoning are often not linked to 
pesticide exposure.160 EPA stated that it was "difficult to conclude, 
based on incident data, that reentry protections such as REIs are less 
important to the health and safety of rose harvesters than to other 
farmworkers."161 
On December 18, 1996, EPA announced in a press release that 
another early entry exception would be granted to the rose indus-
try.162 The exception allows workers to hand harvest roses grown in 
greenhouses after they are treated with pesticides before their REIs 
have expired.163 EPA found that the benefits of allowing early entry 
over the two-year period were "substantial" and that early entry 
would "not pose unreasonable risks to rose workers."164 
The terms of the 1996 rose industry exception are similar to the 
terms of the earlier 1994 exception.165 Despite the press release stat-
ing that the exception is good for a two-year period, the exception will 
actually be in effect from December 18, 1996, to October 4, 1999.166 
EPA refused to grant Roses Inc.'s request for an indefinite or five-
156 See id. 
157 See id. 
158 See id. Some commenters noted that more pesticide-related illnesses may be reported in 
California because of "California's extensive regulatory program, the general level of public 
awareness about pesticide use, and requirements placed on the medical care industry to report 
all suspected pesticide-related cases." See id. 
169 See id. 
160 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,997. 
161 [d. at 51,998. 
162 See EPA PRESS RELEASE, supra note 9. 
163 See id. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. 
166 See id.; 62 Fed. Reg. at 52,000. 
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year exception, and instead made the exception only effective for the 
shorter period.167 No entry is allowed for the first four hours after any 
pesticide application, and until any inhalation criteria specified on the 
pesticide label is met.l68 The maximum time period that workers are 
allowed in treated areas during an REI is three hours within any 
twenty-four hour period.l69 Rose industry employers are required to 
provide, maintain, and ensure workers wear the early entry PPE 
listed on the pesticide's labeV70 
EPA believes that the danger to workers will be mitigated by the 
limited time harvesters are permitted in the treated area, the use of 
PPE, accessible decontamination facilities, the provision of label-spe-
cific information for harvesters, and the basic safety information that 
employers must provide to workers.l7l However, EPA noted that it 
had "insufficient information" comparing the benefits of using differ-
ent pesticides with varying REIs to treat the same pests.l72 EPA 
defended its decision to grant the exception despite this lack of infor-
mation, stating: 
[D]espite presenting less than the desired amount of comparative 
information regarding pesticides, the Agency believes that there 
is still a need for the exception no matter which individual pesti-
167 See EPA PRESS RELEASE, supra note 9; 61 Fed. Reg. 56,100, 56,102 (1996). 
168 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 52,000. 
169 See id. EPA did not grant Roses Inc.'s request to allow workers in treated areas for a 
maximum of eight hours in the two-week period before mlijor floral holidays. See 61 Fed. Reg. 
at 56,101. According to Roses Inc., the five mlijor floral holidays are Christmas, Valentine's Day, 
Secretary's Day, Mother's Day, and Sweetest Day. See id. Roses Inc. stated that the eight hour 
time period was necessary because roses have a short shelf life and cannot be stored to meet 
the increased demands of the floral holidays. See id. 
170 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 52,000. EPA also requires that the early entry workers are informed 
about the pesticide's label requirements related to use, and that they are informed that they 
are entering a treated area under the rose industry exception. See id. 
171 See EPA PRESS RELEASE, 8Upra note 9. The following additional factors or terms contrib-
uted to EP.Ns decision: (1) Early entry PPE could be comfortably worn for 3 hours; (2) use of 
unattached absorbent glove liners make it much more likely that harvesters will wear the 
required chemical resistant gloves or liners underneath the optional leather gloves; (3) there is 
approximately only 200 greenhouse cut-rose growers, facilitating communication and compli-
ance monitoring activity between the rose industry and EPA; (4) the scale of greenhouse 
operations and limited number of harvesters per greenhouse should allow employers to more 
easily ensure that workers wear the PPE; (5) cut-rose growers using this exception will be 
required to report any incidents which harvesters believe are the result of pesticide exposure 
occurring during early-entry harvesting under the conditions of this exception; (6) running 
water, and in some cases showers, for decontamination and heat-stress alleviation are more 
accessible in greenhouse operations than in field settings; and (7) the exception will be in effect 
for less than 3 years before reevaluation. 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,999. 
1'12 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,996. EPA stated that ''this deficiency should be remedied if another 
renewal is requested." [d. . 
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cides may be used. Regardless of the justification of the necessity 
of any particular pesticide, clearly the cut-rose industry cannot 
currently rely only on 4-hour REI pesticides, changes in cultural 
practices or drastic reductions of the number of pesticide applica-
tions. Therefore, even if several individual pesticides were deter-
mined unessential, growers would still be faced with applying 
mostly longer REI pesticides at frequencies similar to the pre-
sent.l73 
Although EPA stated that early entry with PPE is "feasible and 
provides adequate reduction of risks to rose harvesters,"l74 EPA pro-
vided funding to the National Institute of Occupational Safety and 
Health to evaluate the effectiveness of PPE in decreasing pesticide 
residue exposure.l75 
EPA granted the exception for only a limited period to give the rose 
industry time to adapt their practices to eliminate the need for the 
exception.l76 The industry will be required to identify specific research 
methods that will be employed to bring individual growers into even-
tual compliance with the regulations.l77 EPA noted that better docu-
mentation on the use of alternate practices will be necessary in the 
future if another exception is sought.l78 
V. CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
A. History of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The type of cost-benefit analysis used in the EPA WPS exception 
process is nothing new.l79 Cost-benefit analysis is based on the utili-
tarian theories of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.lso Utilitarian 
theory provides that laws should be written so that the greatest good 
is provided to the greatest number of people.l8l According to this 
theory, only when the benefits of the proposed rule outweigh the costs 
is the greatest good done for the greatest number of people.l82 Cost-
173 Id. 
174Id. at 51,999. 
175 See id. 
176 See id. at 51,998; EPA PRESS RELEASE, supra note 9; 61 Fed. Reg. 56,100, 56,102 (1996). 
177 See EPA PRESS RELEASE, supra note 9. 
178 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 52,000-01. 
179 See Bernard Schwartz, The Caurt and Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Administrative Law Idea 
Whose Time Has Come - OT Gone, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 291, 292 (1981). 
180 See id. 
181 See id. (citing 10 Jeremy Bentham, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 142 (Bowring, ed. 
1962». 
1112 See id. 
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benefit analysis is also viewed as less arbitrary than other regulatory 
decision processes because the agency engages in a scientific type 
analysis.l83 
The first piece of legislation to use cost-benefit analysis was the 
Flood Control Act of 1936, which stated that federal projects should 
be done only when "the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are 
in excess of the estimated costS."l84 Until very recently, the use of 
cost-benefit analysis was not often expressly provided for in federal 
legislation.l86 However, early agencies, such as the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, were often forced to consider the costs involved 
to the industries they regulated when making rules. l86 These agencies 
were often created with the purpose of protecting the economic inter-
ests of the very industry that was being regulated.l87 The agencies 
had to analyze the potential costs of proposed regulations because the 
agency's primary "constituency" would often be the regulated indus-
try itself.l88 
The creation of EPA and other similar agencies to promote social, 
rather than economic, goals led to less concern over the costs of the 
proposed regulations to the many different industries that were being 
regulated.l89 These agencies more often had public interest groups as 
their "constituency" which condemned sacrificing environmental 
safety because of its effect on prices and operating costs.loo Often 
statutes would set minimum standards of health without any regard 
for cost, and specifically prohibited the use of cost-benefit analysis.19l 
However, with the growing popularity of legal economic theory, fed-
183 See Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,193 (1981). Executive Order Number 
12,291, issued in 1981 by President Reagan, required a cost-benefit analysis to be done before 
enacting regulations. See ill. The purposes of the Executive Order were "to reduce the burdens 
of existing and future regulations, increase agency accQUntability for regulatory actions, pro-
vide for presidential oversight of the regulatory process, minimize duplication and conflict of 
regulations, and insure well-reasoned regulations." Id. (emphasis added). 
184 33 U.S.C. § 710a (1976). In American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 
490, 510 (1981), the United States Supreme Court stated that the statute's language indicated 
the intent of Congress was to require a cost-benefit analysis. See also Schwartz, supra note 179, 
at 292. 
185 See Schwartz, supra note 179, at 292. 
188 See ill. at 293. 
18'/ See ill. 
188 See ill. 
189 See ill. at 294. 
190 See Schwartz, supra note 179, at 294. 
191 See ill. For example, the Delaney Clause of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provides an 
absolute bar to selling food that has any pesticide residue that is carcinogious. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 348(c)(3)(A) (1994); see also Bell v. Goddard, 366 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1966). The Endangered 
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eral statutes are now more often requiring EPA-type agencies to 
conduct cost-benefit analyses while regulating.1OO 
Shortly after taking office in 1981, President Reagan issued Execu-
tive Order 12,291, which adopted a cost-benefit theory of federal 
regulation.l93 The order required that regulatory action not be done 
''unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh 
the potential costs to society."l94 This requires federal agencies in the 
executive branch, like EPA, to engage in cost-benefit analysis before 
enacting regulations.196 More recently, efforts have been underway in 
Congress to enact federal legislation that will make cost-benefit analy-
sis mandatory for all agency regulation unless another method of 
rulemaking is provided for in the applicable statute.196 
Species Act also does not allow the consideration of cost when it prohibits both the taking of 
any animal listed as endangered and the destruction of any habitat crucial to the survival of a 
species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994). The Clean Air Act also mandates that EPA consider 
public health, without regard to cost, when establishing ambient air quality standards. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7409(b)(1) (1994). Occasionally, EPA uses cost-benefit analysis even in the face of a direct 
prohibition in the statute, especially when the health effects of the pollutants being regulated 
are uncertain. See Victor B. Flatt, Environmental "Contraction" for America? (Or How I 
Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the EPA), 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 585,601 (1996). At least 
one court has disapproved of the cost-benefit analysis done in the case of the ozone standard 
under the Clean Air Act, but at the same time allowed the standard set by EPA. See id. (citing 
American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1981». 
192 See generally National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994) (requires balanc-
ing environmental costs of project against economic and technological benefits); Consumer 
Products Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (1994) (determination of what constitutes ''unreasonable 
risk" of injury by product requires balancing costs and benefits). 
193 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,193 (1981). President Carter first 
adopted cost-benefit analysis for executive branch agencies in 1978. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 
43 Fed. Reg. 12,661, 12,661 (1978). President Clinton issued a similar order in 1993. See Exec. 
Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 (1993). 
194 See 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193. 
196 See id. In fact, when EPA enacted the WPS it made a finding, under Executive Order 
Number 12,291, that "the benefits to society from avoided incidents of acute, allergic, and 
delayed adverse effects from occupational exposures to agricultural-plant pesticides exceed the 
costs attributable to [the WPS requirements]." 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102,38,145 (1992). In completing 
its cost-benefit analysis, EPA noted that the benefits from "the reduction in lost time from the 
workforce, reduced medical expenses, and increased well-being and productivity through being 
less affected by pesticide poisoning" and other related benefits could not be adequately quan-
tified with available data. See id. 
196 See Flatt, supra note 191, at 588; Junius C. McElveen & Chris Amantea, Legislating Risk 
Assessment, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (1995). 
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B. Problems with Cost-Benefit Analysis 
In theory, cost-benefit analysis may be a good way to develop 
regulations and standards. l97 After all, taking account of the costs and 
benefits of a proposed rule may lead to the most happiness for all,198 
Also, a cost-benefit decision process may make agencies more ac-
countable for their decisions by encouraging them to engage in a 
reasoned analysis.l99 
However, in reality, how one person values health or the risk of 
impaired health may be different from another person.2OO The problem 
is that the values that a person will assign certain factors, such as 
worker well-being, will depend on that person's own perspective and 
self interest.201 In effect, each person has their own personal cost-
benefit analysis.202 To address this problem agencies try to make their 
conclusions based on "scientific" findings and make their cost-benefit 
analysis scientifically objective.2OO However, cost-benefit analysis suf-
fers from the inherent problems of suspect valuation of these scientific 
factors and whose values are really being considered in the analysis.204 
The scientific approach to cost-benefit analysis does not cure the 
problem of the valuation of supposedly scientific factors.206 It is some-
times difficult to put numerical values on societal factors, such as 
worker health, well-being, and productivity.2OO Also, it is sometimes 
difficult to put the risk to workers or the environment when exposed 
to pollutants in numerical terms that are accurate.207 This is a result 
of the long period of time that it takes some diseases to appear in 
workers exposed to low levels of toxic substances.208 Also, different 
1117 See Flatt, supra note 191, at 603. 
198 See Schwartz, supra note 179, at 292. 
199 See Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193. Executive Order Number 12,291, issued 
in 1981 by President Reagan, required a cost-benefit analysis to be done before enacting 
regulations. See id. The purposes of the Executive Order were "to reduce the burdens of 
existing and future regulations, increase agency accountability for regulatory actions, provide 
for presidential oversight of the regulatory process, minimize duplication and conflict of regu-
lations, and insure well-reasoned regulations." [d. (emphasis added). 
200 See Flatt, supra note 191, at 604--05. 
201 See id. at 605. 
200 See id. 
200 See id. 
ZOI. See id. at 604. 
206 See Flatt, supra note 191, at 606. 
206 See 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102, 38,145 (1992). 
2CY1 See Flatt, supra note 191, at 606. 
208 See McElveen, supra note 196, at 1561. 
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studies may reach different conclusions as to the risk that a particular 
toxin presents to human safety.209 
Even if an agency were able to assign an appropriate value to social 
variables, someone must still decide what level of safety is neces-
sary.210 When making decisions of what are acceptable levels of risk 
to worker health or what is an unacceptable cost to a particular 
industry, agencies are not dealing with scientific fact.211 These deci-
sions are policy choices, regardless of the scientific jargon used in 
rationalizing the decisions.212 It is not surprising, considering the value 
judgments involved with cost-benefit analysis, that it has been criti-
cized for benefiting a few at the expense of others.213 Cost-benefit 
analysis is not objective science, but a public policy and political means 
of justifying choosing one person's values over the values of another.214 
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Feasibility Standard of OSHA 
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petro-
leum Institute, which is popularly referred to as the Benzene decision, 
the United States Supreme Court refused to find that the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) (Section 6(b)(5) of 29 U.S.C. 
§ 655(b)(5» requires a cost-benefit analysis, but the Court seemed to 
approve of quantitative risk assessment by regulatory bodies.215 In a 
later decision, American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 
the United States Supreme Court stated that "[w]hen Congress has 
intended that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly 
209 See Flatt, supra note 191, at 606. 
210 See id. 
211 See McElveen & Amanatea, supra note 196, at 1553. 
212 See id. Also, when making a decision between one particular scientific study and another 
as to a particular factor's value, the agency is still deciding what values society weighs most 
heavily. See Flatt, supra note 191, at 606. 
213 See Flatt, supra note 191, at 603. 
214 See id. at 606. 
215 See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 615, 645 
(1980) [hereinafter Benzene]; McElveen & Amanatea, supra note 196, at 1565-66. Four of the 
Justices (the plurality, because Justice Rehnquist agreed with the result) found, under the OSH 
Act, that OSHA had the burden of showing that exposure to a particular toxic substance above 
the level specified in a regulation presented a significant health risk. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 
642. Although the plurality did not define what a significant risk was, three of the Justices gave 
examples of the concept using quantitative terms. See id. at 655. The significant risk determi-
nation was instead left to OSHA. See id. They noted that odds of one in one billion that a person 
will die of cancer from drinking chlorinated water would be insignificant, while chances of one 
in one thousand that regular exposure to benzene would be fatal might lead a reasonable person 
to conclude that there is a significant risk. See id. 
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indicated such intent on the face of the statute.''216 The Court held that 
OSHA was not required by the OSH Act to show that the benefits of 
a standard set for the cotton industry outweighed the costs of attain-
ing the desired reduction in cotton dust.217 The Court noted that 
Section 655(b)(5) of the OSH Act stated that "[t]he Secretary ... shall 
set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extentfeasible, 
on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will 
suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.''218 The 
Court defined the term "to the extent feasible" as "capable of being 
done," instead of the lower standard sought by the textile industry 
that would have required a cost-benefit analysis.219 The Court noted 
that the legislative history of the OSH Act showed that Congress 
knew the Act would impose substantial costs on employers, but that 
such costs were to be imposed to ensure safe working conditions.220 In 
determining the intent of Congress when enacting the OSH Act, the 
Court noted Senator Eagleton's summary of Congresses' position.221 
The Senator stated that "[ w ]hether we, as individuals, are motivated 
by simple humanity or by simple economics, we can no longer permit 
profits to be dependent upon an unsafe or unhealthy worksite.''222 
Although American Textile Manufacturers Institute did not re-
quire OSHA to engage in a cost-benefit analysis because the OSH Act 
did not require it, an agency may engage in a cost-benefit analysis 
when the statute does not otherwise explicitly reject that interpreta-
tion.223 This interpretation of American Textile Manufacturers Insti-
tute is strengthened by the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council224 Chevron 
requires a deferral to a permissible agency interpretation of a statute 
216 American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981). 
217 See id. at 512. 
218 See id. at 508. The Court also noted the general language of the definition of the term 
"occupational safety and health standard" as "a standard which requires conditions ... reason-
ably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment." Id. at 512. Although 
the Court believed that this language might be construed to contemplate a cost-benefit type 
analysis, it found that the general terms in the definition did not override the specific statutory 
standard of "to the extent feasible." See id. 
219 See id. at 508-09. 
220 See id. at 514. The Court stated, "Congress viewed the costs of health and safety as a cost 
of doing business." Id. 
221 See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., 452 U.S. at 522. 
222 Id. (citing 116 CONGo REC. 41,764 (1970». "We are talking about people's lives, not the 
indifference of some cost accountants." Id. at 521. 
228 See Schwartz, supra note 179, at 305. 
224 See 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). 
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unless it is contrary to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress.226 This Congressional intent is determined by the statute's lan-
guage and legislative history.226 If Congress did not directly speak on 
the issue, then it will be assumed by the reviewing court that Con-
gress gave the agency broad discretion.227 
D. Operation of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
When an agency engages in cost-benefit analysis, it must state the 
method that it arrived at its conclusion.228 The agency may not simply 
state that the benefits of the proposed standard or rule outweigh the 
costS.229 Also, the agency must consider all those factors that Congress 
intended that it consider.230 The United States Supreme Court has 
stated that 
[n]ormally, an agency rule [will] be arbitrary and capricious if the 
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it 
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter 
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.231 
An agency must explain any change of position that it has on a 
particular standard or policy.232 Such an explanation must consist of a 
reasoned analysis.233 However, new standards that are based on new 
evidence do not require the same level of analysis.234 
FIFRA requires that EPA start suspension proceedings for the 
cancellation of any pesticide that either poses an imminent hazard or 
has unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.236 Both of these 
standards require EPA to conduct a cost-benefit analysis.236 The de-
226 See id. 
226 See id. at 842, 845. 
227 See id. at 843-44. 
226 See Benzene, 448 U.S. 607, 670 (1980) (powell, J., concurring). 
229 See id. 
280 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
231 [d. 
232 See National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875, 883 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (EPA's change of position on safety of EDB in foreign mangoes had to be supplied 
with reasoned analysis); see also Benzene, 448 U.S. at 718-19, 710 n.27. 
288 See National Coalition Against tM Misuse of Pesticides, 809 F.2d at 883. 
284 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
236 See 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b), (c)(1) (1994). 
236 See id. § 136(bb), (I). The courts have found that EPA must issue a notice of intent to cancel 
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scriptions of the cases that follow show how the courts have examined 
EPA cost-benefit decisions involving the suspension of pesticide reg-
istrations.237 
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, the Secretary of 
Agriculture had refused to suspend the registration of DDT under 
FIFRA despite his own questions regarding the pesticide's risk to the 
environment.238 The Secretary noted that large amounts of DDT pro-
duced cancer in animals and humans, but that its effects in small doses 
were unknown.239 Therefore, the Secretary refused to suspend DDT's 
registration stating that "DDT has important beneficial uses in con-
nection with disease control and protection of various crops.''240 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit remanded the case to EPA for more findings because of the 
Secretary's acknowledgment that there was "a substantial question 
concerning the safety of DDT.''241 The court held that the Secretary 
must explain the reasons for not suspending the registration of a 
pesticide when the product's safety is at issue.242 
In Wellford v. Ruckelshaus, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case to EPA for further 
consideration of its conclusion that the risk of harm from the use of 
2,4,5-T on food crops was insufficient to warrant a suspension.243 EPA 
had come to this conclusion because pesticide residues were found to 
be negligible in food that is actually sold to consumers.244 The court 
stated that the Secretary:245 
a pesticide's registration or change its classification "whenever there is a substantial question 
about the safety of a registered pesticide." See Environmental Defense Fund, 510 F.2d at 1296 
n.4; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The 
suspension order must include ''findings pertaining to the question of 'imminent hazard.'" 7 
U.S.C. § 136d(c)(I); see Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1988). 
237 See infra text accompanying notes 238--69. 
2118 See Environmental Defense Fund, 439 F.2d at 594. 
239 See id. The Secretary of Agriculture had found that "DDT is toxic to certain birds, bees, 
and fish, but there is no evidence of harm to the vast majority of species of nontarget organ-
isms." See id. 
240 See id. 
241 See id. at 595. The court found that the unreasonable adverse effects standard of FIFRA 
requires the cancellation of a pesticide's registration whenever "there is a substantial question 
about the safety of a registered pesticide." See id. at 594. 
242 See id. at 593. 
243 See Wellford v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 598, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
244 See id. 
246 EPA only recently had been created and therefore the Secretary of Agriculture had the 
responsibility for making the decision regarding the use of 2,4,5-T. See id. 
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did not discuss the risk of injury to fannworkers or others who 
might be exposed to the chemical by virtue of its use on food 
crops, despite the fact that he clearly recognizes a hazard from 
direct exposure .... We are troubled by the possibility that the 
Secretary failed to give petitioners' allegations the careful consid-
eration to which they were entitled, or that he failed to assign 
sufficient importance to the risk of harm to human lives.246 
In the 1972 Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA decision, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
found that EPA had failed to do an adequate analysis of the benefits 
of the pesticides, aldrin and dieldrin.247 The court stated that: 
a mere recitation of a pesticide's uses does not suffice as an analy-
sis of benefits is fortified where, as here, there was a submission 
by EDF, that alternative pest control mechanisms are available 
for such use. The analysis of benefit requires some consideration 
of whether such proposed alternatives are available or feasible, or 
whether such availability is in doubt.248 
In the 1975 Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA decision, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
upheld EPA's decision to suspend aldrin and dieldrin despite the 
scientific uncertainty of studies that suggested carcinogenic reactions 
in mice.249 The court reasoned that such scientific evidence was in the 
area of the Agency's expertise.250 Also, the court found that the earlier 
refusals to suspend the registrations of aldrin and dieldrin based on 
earlier mice studies did not preclude EPA from changing its policy 
when there was a change in the nature of the evidence.261 The court 
explained that what had changed was not EPA's policy, but the nature 
of the available evidence.262 
The court upheld the EPA's cost-benefit analysis despite the court's 
statement that "[t]he statute places a heavy burden on any adminis-
trative officer to explain the basis for his decision to permit the 
continued use of a chemical known to produce cancer in experimental 
animals.''263 Also, the court dismissed the registrant's arguments that 
246 See id. at 60~3. 
247 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
248 [d. 
249 See 510 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
260 See id. at 1298-99. The court stated that "'FIFRA confers broad discretion' on the Admin-
istrator to find facts and 'to set policy in the public interest.'" [d. at 1297 (citing Wellford, 439 
F.2d at 601.). 
261 See Environmental Defense Fund, 510 F.2d at 1299-1300. 
262 See id. 
263 [d. at 1302. 
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the EPA's decision was inadequate because the Agency failed to pro-
vide extensive cost-benefit analysis for each crop and geographical 
area for which the pesticides were suspended.2M It stated that in an 
expedited suspension proceeding there was no need for such a degree 
of detail, but instead such analysis could be done at the final cancel-
lation proceeding.266 
In Love v. Thomas, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit evaluated the EPA's suspension of the registration of 
dinoseb, a pesticide used in the cultivation of such crops as green peas, 
cucumbers, squash, zucchini, and several types of beans and berries.266 
Studies in possession of EPA in 1986 gave the appearance that di-
noseb caused serious health risks to persons, including sterility in men 
and birth defects in the unborn children of pregnant women.267 A 
group of farmers in the Northwest challenged the suspension order, 
stating that "[t]hey simply could not grow their crops without di-
noseb.''258 They argued that there was no substitute for dinoseb in the 
Northwest and that the entire caneberry269 crop of the Pacific N orth-
west, where ninety-five percent of the nation's commercial caneberry 
crop is grown, would be lost.260 Potential crop losses from the suspen-
sion of dinoseb would amount to $39.2 million in the year of the 
suspension.261 
When making its decision, EPA never evaluated several individual 
crops, including green peas, snap beans, caneberries, and cucurbits, 
because EPA ran out of time and resources.262 The court concluded 
that the data relied on for such crops were incomplete.263 The court 
also showed displeasure with the EPA's conclusion that consumer 
impact of the removal of dinoseb would be "uncertain" for green peas, 
snap beans and berries.264 The grower impact for these crops was 
listed as minor, although the annual increase in treatment costs for 
green peas and berries was estimated by EPA to be $1.2 million and 
$78,000 respectively.266 The court believed that EPA had conducted 
264 See id. at 1303. 
266 See id. 
2Ii6 See Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1349 (9th Cir. 1987). 
257 See id. at 1350. 
268 See id. at 1351. 
269 Caneberries include red raspberries, blackberries, boysenberries, and loganberries. See id. 
at 1350 n.1. 
260 See id. at 1351. 
261 See Love, 858 F.2d at 1352. 
262 See id. 
268 See id. at 1358. 
264 See id. at 1359 n.20. 
266 See id. 
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only a "cursory" investigation of alternative pesticides and the eco-
nomic impact of the suspension in the N orthwest.266 
The court found that the EPA's cost-benefit analysis for several of 
the crops was insufficient.267 The court disagreed with arguments 
made by EPA that it should be allowed to rely on nationwide findings 
as to pesticide alternatives and economic impacts considering the low 
amount of dinoseb used on such crops as green peas and snap beans 
(each account for about two percent of dinoseb usage in the United 
States).268 Therefore, the court declared that the emergency suspen-
sion in its entirety was "arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, and was not issued in accordance with the provisions of FI-
FRA."269 
VI. CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE ROSE INDUSTRY 
EXCEPTION 
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis Should Not Be Used to Grant Exceptions 
to the WPS 
As stated previously, EPA allows anyone affected by the require-
ments of the WPS to request an exception to the prohibition on early 
entry into pesticide treated areas during a REI.270 When determining 
whether to grant an exception, "EPA will base its decision on whether 
the benefits of the exception outweigh the costS."271 In theory, the 
cost-benefit analysis required by the regulations is supposed to en-
sure that the greatest good is done for the greatest number.272 How-
ever, the reality is that how one person may value factors, such as the 
risk of impaired health, will depend on that person's own perspective 
and self interest.273 To avoid the problem of value judgments in cost-
benefit analysis, agencies are supposed to make findings that are 
scientifically objective.274 However, many of the "scientific" variables 
that must be incorporated into the analysis are not easily quantified 
266 See Love, 858 F.2d at 1360. 
267 See id. 
268 See id. 
269 See id. at 1363. 
270 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(e)(I) (1996). 
271 See id. § 170.112(e)(I)(vi). 
272 See Schwartz, supra note 179, at 292. 
273 See Flatt, supra note 191, at 605. 
274 See id. 
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and the weight given these variables depends on whose values are 
used when making the analysis.275 
EPA has stated that it is unable to quantify certain benefits of 
protecting workers from pesticide exposure, such as "the reduction 
in lost time from the workforce, reduced medical expenses, and in-
creased well-being and productivity through being less affected by 
pesticide poisoning ... and any related benefits.''276 Statistics that are 
used to describe the risks that pesticides pose to workers are often 
inaccurate because of reporting problems.277 Thus, although allergic 
and acute effects caused by pesticides can appear during or shortly 
after exposure, these incidents may not be reported because medical 
providers might not recognize or report symptoms of pesticide-re-
lated illnesses, farmworkers often lack the financial means to receive 
medical aid, and pesticide poisoning often mimics the symptoms of 
colds and flU.278 EPA also noted that long term exposure to many of 
the pesticides in Roses Inc.'s 1996 exception request could cause 
increased cancer rates, reproductive and development effects, and 
adverse effects on the nervous system.279 EPA stated that long term 
exposure, such as would be required of workers under the rose indus-
try exception, can produce "delayed, chronic and sub chronic effects 
[that] are generally not reported as pesticide-related incidents be-
cause of the time between exposure and effect."280 Because these 
delayed health effects are generally not reported, the studies that rely 
on such data as support for the proposition that pesticides present a 
low risk to worker health may be flawed.281 Thus, EPA discounted the 
California study relied on by Roses Inc. in its 1996 exception request 
that suggested that rose harvesters do not experience unacceptable 
risks from pesticides as unreliable.282 "EPA does not have sufficient 
data to determine whether the potential level of exposure to rose 
harvesters corresponds to levels of concern identified in the toxico-
logical studies .... "283 EPA stated that it was "difficult to conclude, 
based on incident data, that reentry protections such as REIs are less 
275 See id. at 588; McElveen & Amanatea, supra note 196, at 1553. 
276 See 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102, 38,145 (1992). 
277 See Flatt, supra note 191, at 606. 
278 See 62 Fed. Reg. 51,994, 51,997 (1997). 
279 See id. 
280 See id.; see also McElveen & Amanatea, supra note 196, at 1561 (discussing the difficulty 
in determining a numerical value for the risk that a carcinogenic pesticide will cause cancer). 
281 See 61 Fed. Reg. 56,100, 56,103 (1996). 
282 See id.; 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,997. 
283 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,998. 
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important to the health and safety of rose harvesters than to other 
farmworkers."284 
The economic costs that may be imposed on an industry by pesticide 
regulation may be more easily quantified than other non-economic 
factors.285 The cost to rose growers annually of complying with the 
WPS was estimated in 1994 by EPA by examining the amount of 
harvest loss per week, the frequency at which pesticides are normally 
applied in rose production, toxicity categories of the pesticides used, 
and the times at which roses must be harvested to yield a premium 
price.286 When granting the 1994 rose exception, EPA found that rose 
growers would lose between $22,000 and $50,000 per acre annually 
based primarily on such data submitted by rose growers and Roses 
Inc.287 However, even with these calculations, EPA still concluded that 
it had "insufficient information to project quantitatively the economic 
impacts of not granting an exception to rose growers.'I288 In Love v. 
Thomas, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
showed displeasure when EPA had suspended the use of dinoseb 
despite its findings that consumer impact of the removal of dinoseb 
was ''uncertain'' for green peas, snap beans and berries.289 
Even if EPA could assign appropriate numbers to such factors, 
EPA must still decide what level of safety is necessary.290 Determining 
what the costs to the industry and society must be to outweigh the 
risks to worker health and the environment depends on a value judg-
ment.291 Thus, in Wellford v. Ruckelshaus, where the Secretary of 
Agriculture decided against suspending the use of 2,4,5-T, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated, 
284ld. Uncertainty as to the risks posed by a pesticide has been grounds for remanding an 
agency decision. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 595 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971). In Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, the Secretary of Agriculture noted 
that large amounts of DDT produced cancer in animals and humans, but that its effects in small 
doses was unknown. See id. at 594. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit remanded the case to EPA for more findings because of the Secretary's 
acknowledgment that there was "a substantial question concerning the safety of DDT." See id. 
at 595. 
286 Compare 59 Fed. Reg. 30,265, 30,266 (1994) (estimating cost to rose industry), with 61 Fed. 
Reg. at 56,103 (recognizing difficulty in placing numerical value on risk to worker health from 
rose pesticides). 
286 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,266. 
287 See id. 
288 See id. 
289 See Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1359 n.20 (9th Cir. 1988). 
290 See Flatt, supra note 191, at 606. 
291 See McElveen & Amanatea, supra note 196, at 1553. 
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"We are troubled by the possibility that the Secretary failed to give 
petitioners' allegations the careful consideration to which they were 
entitled, or that he failed assign sufficient importance to the risk of 
harm to human lives."292 In determining how much weight society 
places on such factors, EPA may be unduly influenced by groups that 
do not represent society as a whole.293 In the case of the rose industry 
exception to the WPS, EPA may have placed too much weight on the 
interests of rose growers and their national lobbying group, Roses 
Inc.294 The undue influence of Roses Inc., and rose growers generally, 
on EPA can be seen by EPA's reliance on information submitted 
primarily by these groups as to the costs to the rose industry of 
abiding by the regulations.296 This kind of influence over EPA deci-
sion-making, leads to EPA overemphasizing the values of Roses Inc. 
and rose growers when it engages in cost-benefit analysis.296 Thus, the 
cost-benefit analysis used by EPA in granting the rose industry ex-
ception could not be truly objective because it necessarily involved 
value judgments.297 
Another argument against using cost-benefit analysis to determine 
industry specific exceptions to pesticide reentry time limits is that 
such analysis is not specifically authorized by FIFRA.298 As the 
United States Supreme Court stated in American Textile Manufac-
tures Institute v. Donovan, "[ w ]hen Congress has intended that an 
agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such 
intent on the face of the statute."299 Although FIFRA requires a 
cost-benefit analysis when registering a pesticide,soo the Act does not 
address specifically how to determine when it is safe for a farmworker 
2112 See Wellford v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 598, 602~3 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also Love, 858 F.2d 
at 1359 n.20 (court notes that grower impact for green peas and berries was listed as minor, 
although annual changes in treatment costs for these crops were estimated by EPA to be $1.2 
million and $78,000, respectively). 
293 See Flatt, supra note 191, at 603 (criticizing cost-benefit analysis for benefiting the few at 
the expense of others). 
294 See id.; 61 Fed. Reg. 56,100, 56,101 (1996). 
296 See 59 Fed. Reg. 30,265, 30,266 (1994). EPA granted the 1994 exception based on calcula-
tions by the rose industry of economic costs despite EPA's own conclusion that it ''had in-
sufficient information to project quantitatively the economic impacts of not granting an excep-
tion to rose growers." See id. 
296 See Flatt, supra note 191, at 603. 
29'/ See id. at 606. 
296 See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981). 
299 See id. 
800 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a(c)(5)(C), 136 (bb) (1994). FIFRA allows EPA to register a pesticide if the 
Agency finds that ''it will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects 
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to reenter a farm or greenhouse after the application of an already 
registered pesticide.sol 
In the absence of such a specific standard in FIFRA, it could be 
argued that the OSH Act's statutory requirement of making stand-
ards for worksites that assure, "to the extent feasible, . . . that no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health" should guide 
EPA.802 A feasibility requirement would force EPA to enact regula-
tions that protect farmworkers from exposure to pesticides at a level 
that is "capable of being done" by the industry, instead of a level set 
according to a lower cost-benefit standard.8°S The Congressional intent 
behind the OSH Act, as noted by the United States Supreme Court 
in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, supports the conclusion 
that profits can no longer be dependent upon an unsafe or unhealthy 
worksite and that cost-benefit analysis should not be applied when 
dealing with worker safety.304 
However, the argument that EPA cannot use cost-benefit analysis 
to grant exceptions to the prohibition on early entry probably would 
not be successful in court.306 Under the Organized Migrants in Com-
munity Action v. Brennan decision, EPA can promulgate farmworker 
protection standards pursuant to FIFRA, and these standards pre-
empt OSHA from enacting similar regulations.306 Thus, a court prob-
ably would find that the OSH Act's feasibility standard does not 
apply.307 The lack of specific language in FIFRA as to what standards 
should be used when enacting farmworker protection regulations 
would probably cause a court, under the Chevron ruling, to find that 
EPA has been given broad discretion on the issue.80S EPA apparently 
believes that a cost-benefit analysis is "required" by FIFRA when 
deciding to grant or deny a request for an exception.809 A court prob-
on the environment." [d. § 136a(c)(5)(C). The term "unreasonable adverse effects on the envi-
ronment" is defined in FIFRA as "any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking 
into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any 
pesticide." [d. § 136(bb). 
801 See generally id. §§ 136-136y. 
802 See American Thxtile Mfrs. [nst., 452 U.S. at 508. 
303 See id. at 508--09. 
804 See id. at 521-22. 
806 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984); Organized Migrants in Community Action v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). 
806 See Organized Migrants in Community Action, 520 F.2d at 1169. 
807 See id. 
8(11 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
809 See 62 Fed. Reg. 51,994, 51,994 (1997). 
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ably would find that EPA's decision to use a cost-benefit analysis is a 
permissible interpretation of FIFRA because of its provision for the 
use of such analysis when making pesticide registration decisions.3lo 
Therefore, despite the problems with value judgments and inaccurate 
valuation in cost-benefit analysis, a court probably would find that 
EPA can use cost-benefit analysis to grant exceptions, such as the 
rose industry exception, to the WPS.311 
B. EPA Failed to Examine All Required Factors When the 
Agency Granted the Rose Industry Exception 
A court usually will defer to an agency's conclusion as to whether 
the costs of a proposed regulation outweigh its benefits unless the 
decision was arbitrary and capricious.312 The deference to agency 
decision-making is based on the policy that courts do not have the 
same expertise, scientific or otherwise, that an agency has with re-
gards to issues the agency regulates.313 Therefore, a court probably 
would not remand EPA's finding that the benefits of granting the rose 
industry exception outweigh the costs, if EPA considered all the 
factors that it was required to consider under FIFRA.314 As the court 
in the 1975 Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA decision stated, 
'''FIFRA confers broad discretion' on the Administrator to find facts 
and 'to set policy in the public interest."'316 
However, EPA is not allowed to state simply that the benefits of 
the exception outweigh the costs when the Agency makes exception 
decisions.Sl6 EPA must supply a reasoned analysis for how it arrived 
at its decision.317 A court will find that EPA acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in granting the rose industry exception if the Agency had 
"entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem" under 
consideration.sl8 Congress apparently believes that EPA must con-
310 See id.; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; cf American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 
490,512-13 (1981) (agency can engage in cost-benefit analysis unless statute specifically rejects 
this interpretation). 
311 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; Flatt, supra note 191, at 606; McElveen & Amanatea, supra 
note 196, at 1553. 
312 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
313 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
314 See id. at 1297. 
316 See id. (citing Wellford v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 598, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1971». 
316 See Benzene, 448 U.S. 607, 670 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). 
317 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (mere 
recitation of a pesticide's uses does not suffice as a cost-benefit analysis). 
318 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
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sider all relevant factors before granting an exception to the WPS 
requirements.319 This can be seen from its strong objection to EPA 
granting an exception in 1994 to the cut flower and cut fern industry 
because EPA had not adequately considered California regulations 
prohibiting early entry.320 If EPA did not consider all of the factors 
that it was supposed to consider when engaging in its cost-benefit 
analysis, then the rose industry exception decision will be remanded 
to EPA for more analysis.321 
EPA's decision to grant the rose industry exception was arbitrary 
and capricious because the Agency failed to determine the risks that 
specific pesticides with varying REIs would have on early entry 
workers as a result of the exception.322 Without considering the effects 
of specific pesticides on worker health, EPA would not have ade-
quately assessed an important factor in its cost-benefit analysis.323 
Pursuant to the WPS, EPA is required to examine the risk to workers 
in its cost-benefit analysis when deciding to grant an exception.324 The 
cost-benefit analysis used in WPS exception decisions is analogous to 
the cost-benefit analysis used when EPA makes suspension of pesti-
cide registration decisions.325 Both types of analysis should be similar 
because both come from the same statutory authority, namely FI-
FRA.326 
In Love v. Thomas, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit found the EPA's decision to suspend the registration of 
dinoseb arbitrary and capricious.327 Although studies in possession of 
EPA in 1986 gave the appearance that dinoseb caused serious health 
risks to persons, the court found that the Agency could not rely solely 
319 See 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102, 38,138 (1992). 
320 See id. Congress "note[d] that California prohibits early entry for hand labor without 
apparent deleterious effect on the cut flower industry." [d. 
321 See Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988). 
322 See id. at 1360; 62 Fed. Reg. 51,994, 51,996 (1997). 
323 See Love, 858 F.2d at 1360; cf. Wellford v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 598, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 
(EPA decision to permit use of 2,4,5-T remanded to agency when it failed to include risk to 
farmworkers in cost-benefit analysis). 
324 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(e)(1)(vi) (1996). The WPS states that when determining whether 
to grant an exception, "EPA will base its decision on whether the benefits of the exception 
outweigh the costs, including the value of the health risks attributable to the exception." See id. 
(emphasis added). When amending FIFRA in 1972, the United States Senate Committee on 
Agriculture and Forestry stated that EPA was required to have the ''labeling and classification 
of pesticides be such as to protect farmers, farm workers, and others [from] coming in contact 
with pesticides or pesticide residues." See S. REP. No. 92--883, at 43-46 (1972), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 4063. 
325 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1994) . 
. 326 [d. 
327 See Love, 858 F.2d at 1363. 
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on this information without making specific findings as to the eco-
nomic costs to each crop affected by the suspension.328 Thus, EPA's 
decision was arbitrary and capricious when it did not make specific 
findings as to the costs that would be imposed by the suspension of 
dinoseb on green peas and snap beans, even though each of these 
crops only account for about two percent of total dinoseb usage in the 
United States.329 The court disagreed with arguments made by EPA 
that the Agency should be allowed to rely on nationwide findings on 
economic impacts considering the low amount of dinoseb used on such 
crops.330 
In the case of the rose industry exception EPA noted that it had 
"insufficient information" comparing the benefits of using different 
pesticides with varying REIs to treat the same pests.331 EPA de-
fended its decision to grant the exception despite this lack of infor-
mation, stating: 
[D]espite presenting less than the desired amount of comparative 
information regarding pesticides, the Agency believes that there 
is still a need for the exception no matter which individual pesti-
cides may be used. Regardless of the justification of the necessity 
of any partiCUlar pesticide, clearly the cut-rose industry cannot 
currently rely only on 4-hour REI pesticides, changes in cultural 
practices or drastic reductions of the number of pesticide applica-
tions. Therefore, even if several individual pesticides were deter-
mined unessential, growers would still be faced with applying 
mostly longer REI pesticides at frequencies similar to the pre-
sent.332 
However, EPA cannot simply state that the economic costs to the rose 
industry are so great that the Agency does not have to examine the 
risks that specific pesticides with varying REIs will pose to work-
ers.333 This follows from Love v. Thomas, where the EPA's findings 
that dinoseb posed a serious health risk did not relieve the Agency of 
the necessity to examine the economic costs to the green pea and snap 
bean industries.334 EPA must examine the risks that specific pesticides 
may have on workers in the same manner that the Agency was 
required to examine the costs of suspending dinoseb on those minor 
328 See id. at 1350, 1360. 
iI29 See id. at 1358, 1360. 
830 See id. at 1360. 
881 See 62 Fed. Reg. 51,994, 51,996 (1997). EPA also stated that ''this deficiency should be 
remedied if another renewal is requested." [d. 
882 [d. 
888 See Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1360 (9th Cir. 1988). 
884 See id. at 1358, 1360. 
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crops.336 Therefore, in the case of the rose industry exception, EP.Ns 
decision was arbitrary and capricious because the Agency did not 
examine the risks that specific pesticides with varying REls would 
pose to workers.336 
There is reason to believe that if EPA had examined the risks that 
specific pesticides would pose to workers, the Agency would either 
not have granted the exception or would have limited its scope to only 
apply to certain pesticides.ss7 In Roses Inc.'s request for an exception 
to the WPS restrictions, Roses Inc. identified twenty-eight different 
pesticides that it believed were "essential" to the industry.ss8 EPA 
noted that several of the chemicals listed were in Toxicity Categories 
I and II based on a more heightened risk to human health.SS9 Included 
on the list of essential pesticides was Chlorothalonil, a forty-eight 
hour REI pesticide for which EPA had denied eleven states an ex-
ception from the WPS for harvesting cantaloupe and squash.340 As 
mentioned previously, Chlorothalonil can cause eye and skin irritation 
and can have adverse effects on the kidneys.341 EPA declined to grant 
the cantaloupe and squash exception despite growers' claims that 
spray schedules could not be changed to fit the forty-eight hour REI 
of Chlorothalonil and that alternatives to the use of Chlorothalonil 
were inadequate.342 Like roses, squash and cantaloupe are harvested 
daily.343 While overripe squash could be sold as a downgraded product, 
overripe cantaloupes are produced for a fresh market only.344 In the 
835 See id. at 1360. 
1!86 See id.; 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,996. However, the 1975 decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 510 F.2d 
1292, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1975), dismissed the registrant's argument that EPA's decision was inade-
quate because the Agency failed to provide extensive cost-benefit analysis for each crop and 
geographical area for which the pesticides were suspended. The court stated that in an expe-
dited suspension proceeding there was no need for such a degree of detail, but instead such 
analysis could be done at the final cancellation proceeding. See Environmental Defense Fund, 
510 F.2d at 1303. In the case of the rose industry decision, there was no expedited proceeding, 
nor was one apparently necessary, since there was a time lapse of almost five months between 
the expiration of the first exception and Roses Inc.'s proper request for the second exception. 
See 61 Fed. Reg. 56,100, 56,101 (1996). 
337 Compare 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,996 (factors contributing EPA's decision to grant rose industry 
exception) with 60 Fed. Reg. 30,872, 30,873 (1995) (factors contributing to EPA's decision to deny 
an exception for the use of Chlorothalonil on cantaloupe and squash). 
338 See 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,103. 
339 See id. 
340 See 61 Fed. Reg. 29,096, 29,097 (1995). 
341 See 60 Fed. Reg. 49,841, 49,844 (1995). 
342 See 60 Fed. Reg. at 30,873. 
343 See id.; 62 Fed. Reg. 51,994, 51,995 (1997). 
344 See 60 Fed. Reg. at 49,844. 
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case of roses, there is a secondary market for imperfect roses, con-
sisting mostly of street vendors.345 Maryland estimated that a maxi-
mum of ten to fifteen percent loss of yield would be incurred for both 
cantaloupe and squash,346 while Delaware estimated that fifty to sev-
enty percent of grower net revenue would be lost without the excep-
tion.347 These figures are similar to the Roses Inc.'s claims that without 
the rose industry exception losses would be seven to fourteen percent 
of the annual harvest.348 Therefore, because of the similarity of the 
necessity for the exceptions in the cantaloupe, squash, and rose indus-
tries, EPA may have declined to grant the rose industry exception if 
it had examined the risks that specific pesticides, such as chlorotha-
lonil, posed to rose workers.349 
There is reason to believe that pesticides, such as Chlorothalonil, 
present an even greater risk to worker health when used in the rose 
industry.350 Some commenters on the rose industry exception believed 
that the risk to rose workers was serious due to the high volume of 
pesticides used and the high frequency of application typical in the 
rose industry.351 The WPS restrictions for greenhouses are generally 
more stringent than those for farm or forest application because 
production areas in greenhouses are often close together and plants 
requiring different pesticide treatments often occupy the same plant 
bed.352 Also, EPA has discussed two studies that suggest that rose 
workers may experience higher pesticide exposure than workers in 
other agricultural fields.353 Therefore, there is reason to believe that 
if the EPA had examined the risks posed by specific pesticides to 
workers in the rose industry, the Agency would either not have 
346 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,996. 
346 This estimation was based on the assumption that a one day delay in harvesting would 
occur each week resulting in a loss of one-seventh of each grower's total production. See id. 
347 See id. Although EPA discounted these claims, stating that it had "incomplete information" 
and that it was "not able to quantify or complete a reliable qualitative assessment of the 
projected economic impacts, yield loss and grower profit associated with loss of harvest days," 
the claims are made somewhat stronger by Indiana's similar estimates of seven percent crop 
loss and 59% grower income loss in its 1996 exception request for Chlorothalonil-treated musk-
melon fields. See 61 Fed. Reg. 29,096, 29,097-98 (1996); 60 Fed. Reg. at 49,844. 
348 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,996. 
349 Cf id. (factors contributing to EPA's decision to grant rose industry exception) with 60 
Fed. Reg. 30,872, 30,873 (1995) (factors contributing to EPA's decision to deny an exception for 
the use of Chlorothalonil on cantaloupe and squash). 
350 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,997; 59 Fed. Reg. 30,265, 30,266 (1994); 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102, 38,109-10 
(1992). 
361 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,997. 
362 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,109-10. 
363 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,266. 
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granted the exception or would have limited its scope to only apply 
to certain pesticides.364 
C. EPA Has Changed its Policy Regarding PPE and the 
Possibility of Alternatives to the Exception Without Reasoned 
Analysis 
1. Possibility of Alternatives to Early Entry in the Rose Industry 
EPA stated that the 1994 rose industry exception was intended to 
be only "temporary,"366 and the exception was supposed to "provide 
rose growers time to adjust pesticide spray schedules, find early-en-
try alternatives, and develop technology."366 The Agency had stated 
at the time it granted the 1994 exception that another exception 
would only be considered if the rose industry could "clearly demon-
strate that an aggressive attempt to develop and implement alterna-
tive practices was made during the period ofth[e] exception."367 How-
ever, in Roses Inc.'s 1996 request for an exception, Roses Inc. 
submitted no evidence that "an aggressive attempt to develop and 
implement alternative practices was made during the period of this 
exception."363 Instead of showing how the rose industry had aggres-
sively attempted to implement alternative practices, Roses Inc. gave 
a number of excuses as to why the industry was unable to bring itself 
into compliance.369 By considering Roses Inc.'s exception request 
without the rose industry clearly demonstrating that it had aggres-
sively attempted during the period of the first exception to implement 
864 See Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988); supra notes 337-53. Another 
argument that EPA did not perform an adequate cost-benefit analysis concerns the time period 
of the exception. Cf, Love, 858 F.2d at 1363. In EPA's press release for the rose industry 
exception, EPA stated that ''the benefits of early entry over the next two years are substantial." 
See EPA PRESS RELEASE, supra note 9. However, the exception will actually be in effect from 
December 18, 1996 to October 4, 1999. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 52,000. Therefore, an argument could 
be made that EPA did not engage in a proper cost-benefit analysis because the agency did not 
make any findings for an exception period lasting more than two years. Cf, Love, 858 F.2d at 
1363 (court found pesticide suspension order an abuse of discretion when EPA did not engage 
in cost-benefit analysis for particular region of the country although it did engage in such 
analysis at the national level). 
356 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,270. 
366 See id. at 30,265. 
357 See id. at 30,270. 
368 See 61 Fed. Reg. 56,100, 56,102 (1996). 
359 See id. 
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alternative practices, EPA made a change in policy without a rea-
soned analysis.360 
In Love v. Thomas, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit criticized EPA because it had conducted only a "cur-
sory" investigation of the availability of alternative pesticides to the 
use of dinoseb.361 Also, in the 1972 Environmental Defense Fund v. 
EPA decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit stated that "[t]he analysis of benefit requires some 
consideration of whether ... proposed alternatives are available or 
feasible."362 
EPA believes that the rose industry is capable of adopting alterna-
tive practices to early entry.363 EPA apparently believed that alterna-
tives were possible when it granted the 1994 rose industry exception, 
stating that "much early entry can be eliminated immediately through 
'planning and shifting personnel,' and that in 2 years other alterna-
tives to toxicity category I and II pesticides can be implemented."364 
In the 1996 rose industry exception, EPA refused to grant the rose 
industry an indefinite or five-year exception and instead made the 
exception good only for the shorter period.365 EPA granted the excep-
tion for only a limited period to give the rose industry time to adapt 
their practices to eliminate the need for the exception.366 In Roses 
Inc.'s 1996 exception request, EPA noted that Roses Inc. did not give 
any estimates or loss figures for the almost five month period that 
elapsed between the new request and the expiration of the first ex-
ception.367 This information was necessary for a reasoned analysis on 
the availability of alternative practices because the rose industry was 
required to be in compliance with the WPS during the period.368 
360 See National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875, 883 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (EP.Ns change of position on safety of EDB in foreign mangoes had to be supplied 
with reasoned analysis); 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,102. 
361 See Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1360 (9th Cir. 1988). 
362 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
363 See 62 Fed. Reg. 51,994, 51,998 (1997); 59 Fed. Reg. 30,265, 30,269 (1994); EPA PRESS 
RELEASE, supra note 9. 
364 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,269. 
366 See 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,102; EPA PRESS RELEASE, supra note 9. 
366 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,998; 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,102; EPA PRESS RELEASE, supra note 9. 
The industry is also required to identify specific research methods that will be employed to bring 
individual growers into eventual compliance with the regulations. See EPA PRESS RELEASE, 
supra note 9. 
367 See 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,102. 
368 See id. at 56,101; Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1360 (9th Cir. 1988); Environmental 
Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1972); supra notes 337-53. 
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One alternative to the exception which was discussed by EPA 
would involve spraying after the last harvest of the day, with reentry 
into the greenhouse after the twelve hour REI of most pesticides 
expired the following morning.369 EPA stated that "spraying after the 
last harvest was generally claimed to be unacceptable for a number 
of reasons .... However, little documentation was presented concern-
ing these shortcomings, and there was no evidence given regarding 
their impact. Some of these shortcomings, while generally accepted, 
remain hypothetical or anecdotal."37o EPA granted the rose industry 
exception without deciding if this alternative was acceptable, despite 
the claims by some growers and scientists that late day spraying 
would be effective and that the practice had been successfully used 
in the past.371 EPA noted that better documentation on the use of 
alternate practices would be necessary in the future if another excep-
tion is sought.372 
2. The Effectiveness of PPE 
In its decision to grant the rose industry exception, EPA stated 
that the Agency "designed thEe] exception to reduce the risk associ-
ated with increased exposure."373 EPA stated when it granted the 
exception that the danger to workers will be "mitigated by the limited 
time harvesters are allowed in the treated area, the use of personal 
protection equipment that must be worn by the workers, accessible 
decontamination facilities, the provision of label-specific information 
for harvesters and the basic safety information that employers must 
present to workers."374 However, except for the requirement of no 
more than three hours of exposure during an REI in a twenty-four 
hour period and the limited time period of the exception, the so called 
"conditions" of the exception merely require what is normally re-
quired of agricultural employers when their employees enter into a 
pesticide treated area during a REJ.376 These conditions are not 
viewed by EPA as sufficient to protect worker health however, as can 
be seen by the fact that they don't allow early entry generally.376 
369 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,995. 
370 [d. at 52,000. 
371 See id. 
372 See id. at 52,000--01. 
373 See id. at 51,999. 
374 See EPA PRESS RELEASE, supra note 9. 
375 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112 (1996); 62 Fed. Reg. 51,994, 52,000 (1997). 
376 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(a)(I). 
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Decontamination sites and safety information must be provided to 
workers who enter greenhouses up to thirty days after the expiration 
of an REI even when there is no early entry.377 When early entry is 
allowed by the WPS, workers are never allowed to enter for the first 
four hours after a pesticide application.378 Also, when early entry is 
permitted, the agricultural employer must assure that workers who 
will have contact with pesticide treated surfaces wear PPE that is 
specified on the labeling of the pesticide used.379 Thus, these require-
ments of the rose industry exception do no more than what is nor-
mally required by the WPS when early entry is permitted.3BO 
In regards to PPE, EPA has stated in the past that the routine use 
of PPE is "not only impractical, but also may be risk-inducing due to 
heat stress concerns."381 In general, EPA has stated that "it is likely 
that the PPE would be removed or would be worn incorrectly if it 
were required routinely in most hand labor situations."382 Therefore, 
EPA: 
has concluded that, under most circumstances, allowing routine 
entry for unlimited time to areas under an REI, even with PPE, 
decontamination, and training, will not reduce adequately the risk 
of agricultural workers' exposure to pesticides, and that the eco-
nomic benefits associated with such routine early entry do not 
justify the risks associated with such early entry.383 
However, in granting the rose industry exception, EPA has seem-
ingly changed its position on PPE.384 EPA believes that specific factors 
in rose production make PPE more effective, such as greenhouses 
encompass a smaller area than field crops allowing employers to en-
sure that workers wear PPE,386 harvesting could be done efficiently 
while wearing PPE, rose greenhouses have accessible water, the lim-
ited time for which PPE would be worn, and rose greenhouses have 
377 See id. §§ 170.112(c)(8), 170.130(a)(3), 170.150(a)(1)(i); 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102, 38,123 (1992). 
378 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(c)(3). 
379 See id. § 170.112(c)(4); 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,104. 
380 See 40 C.F.R. § 170.112; 62 Fed. Reg. at 52,000. 
381 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,112. 
382 Id. 
383 Id. 
384 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1299-1300 (D.C. Cir. 1975); 
59 Fed. Reg. 30,265 30,269 (1994). 
385 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,265. Also, it was argued that workers are generally paid on an hourly 
or salary basis instead of a piece rate, which makes it less likely that workers would avoid using 
PPE when it might slow their work. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,997. 
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fans, shades or other mechanical ventilation devices to provide some 
cooling.386 
EPA did not engage in a reasoned analysis when it changed its 
policy on the effectiveness of PPE because its explanation for the 
decision "runs counter to the evidence before the agency, [and] is so 
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 
product of agency expertise.'1387 First, rose growers have consistently 
complained that chemical-resistant gloves are not sufficiently supple 
and durable enough for rose harvesting.388 However, EPA requires 
such gloves for many pesticides that are used in rose production.388 
Therefore, it cannot be said that "harvesting could be accomplished 
in a reasonably efficient manner while wearing the required PPE."390 
Second, the benefits of greenhouses because of their size, the avail-
ability of water, and their cool temperature may be more than offset 
by EPA's many concerns with pesticide exposure in greenhouses.391 
The WPS restrictions for greenhouses are more stringent than for 
farm applications because of the EPA's conclusion that plants requir-
ing different pesticide treatments often occupy the same area.392 Some 
commenters believed that the humid and warm greenhouse environ-
ment might discourage workers from wearing PPE and might make 
heat stress more likely when PPE is worn.393 Also, decontamination 
sites that include water must be provided whenever workers enter a 
pesticide treated area during an REV94 Therefore, whether rose 
greenhouses generally have running water available is irrelevant to 
the effectiveness of PPE.396 The limited time that PPE will be worn 
does not increase its effectiveness and therefore cannot be a reason 
for stating that PPE would be effective in rose harvesting.396 AI-
386 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,269. 
387 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); 
Environmental Defense Fund, 510 F.2d at 1299-1300. 
386 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43; Environmental Defense Fund, 510 F.2d at 
1299-1300. 
889 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,269. EPA allows rose workers to wear leather gloves over chemical 
resistant gloves or to wear absorbent gloves underneath chemical resistant gloves, but EPA 
did not make any indication whether this would make the PPE more efficient for use in rose 
harvesting. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 52,000. 
390 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,269. 
391 See 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102, 38,109--10 (1992). 
392 See id. 
393 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,997. 
894 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 170.112(c)(8), 170.150(b) (1996). 
896 See id. 
396 See id. § 170.112. 
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though EPA believed that early entry with PPE is "feasible and 
provides adequate reduction of risks to rose harvesters,"397 EPA still 
has questions regarding PPE as shown by the Agency's provision of 
funding to the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
to evaluate the effectiveness of PPE in decreasing pesticide residue 
exposure.398 
EPA's decision on PPE for purposes of the rose industry exception 
is not similar to the EPA's decision to suspend the pesticides aldrin 
and dieldrin in the 1975 Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA case.399 
In that decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit upheld the EPA's decision because it was based 
on a change in the nature of the evidence and not a change in policy.4°O 
EPA's decision that PPE is now effective to reduce the risks pesticide 
exposure to workers is a change in policy not based on changes in the 
available evidence.401 The EPA's rose industry exception was arbi-
trary and capricious because the Agency did not engage in a reasoned 
analysis when it changed its position on the effectiveness of PPE.402 
VII. CONCLUSION 
EPA should not be granting exceptions to the WPS for specific 
industries through the use of cost-benefit analysis. Such analysis is 
inherently inaccurate due to the difficulties of valuation, and it has 
been criticized as benefiting the few at the expense of the many. EPA 
has stated that it is unable to quantify certain benefits of protecting 
workers from pesticide exposure. Statistics relied on to quantify such 
non-economic factors are often inaccurate because of reporting prob-
lems, such as the failure to recognize the symptoms of pesticide poi-
soning and the long period after exposure that may elapse before the 
onset of health problems. Even with relatively accurate statistics, 
there is still no way to meaningfully value worker health. There will 
inevitably be a policy decision as to what an "acceptable" worker risk 
is when compared to the costs to the industry. Thus, EPA should not 
397 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,999. 
398 See id. 
899 See id.; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1299-1300 (D.C. Cir. 
1975); 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102,38,109-10 (1992). 
400 See Environmental Defense Fund, 510 F.2d at 1299-1300. 
401 See id.; 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,999; 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,109-10. 
400 See National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875, 883 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (EPA's change of position on safety of EDB in foreign mangoes had to be supplied 
with reasoned analysis). 
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hide behind the scientific jargon of cost-benefit analysis when making 
policy decisions that affect worker health. 
Cost-benefit analysis has not been used by OSHA when determin-
ing industry safety levels for worker exposure to dangerous chemi-
cals. OSHA instead applies a feasibility standard that protects work-
ers from exposure to dangerous chemicals at a level that is "capable 
of being done" by the industry. In the case of the rose industry 
exception, there are alternatives to early entry, such as late day 
spraying, that are "capable of being done" by the rose industry. In 
American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, the United 
States Supreme Court noted Senator Eagleton's belief that 
"[ w ]hether we, as individuals, are motivated by simple humanity or 
by simple economics, we can no longer permit profits to be dependent 
upon an unsafe or unhealthy worksite."403 There is little reason to 
apply a feasibility standard when dealing with worker exposure to 
dangerous chemicals in some industries, but to apply a lower cost-
benefit standard when protecting farmworkers from exposure to pes-
ticides. A feasibility standard should be applied because, as EPA 
recognizes, pesticide exposure poses a serious threat to worker 
health. Therefore, cost-benefit analysis should not be used to balance 
the risks to workers from pesticide exposure against the costs that 
the rose industry would incur to abide by the WPS. 
403 See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 522 (1981). 
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